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lower premiums, but they also typically get less in the form of low synergies. Moreover, both stock and 
accounting returns to the acquirers are lower on average in deals with target CEO bonuses. These results 
support the contractual revision alternative.  Nevertheless, wealth transfer occurs when merger bonuses are 
present in deals where targets exhibit high pre-takeover abnormal accruals or are subject to SEC 
enforcement actions. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we consider a question often asked in the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature: 
whether eleventh hour extra benefits to target CEOs are explained by a rent-extraction agency problem, 
with target CEOs sacrificing merger premiums for personal gain.1 More specifically, we study whether a 
merger bonus, a particular acquisition-related benefit often paid to target CEOs during takeover deals, 
generates a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to acquirer shareholders.  
We propose and evaluate an alternative to the wealth transfer view, which we refer to as the contractual 
revision hypothesis. This alternative view posits that in acquisitions where target firms are expected to 
generate low takeover gains, a side payment that adjusts the target CEO’s merger-related compensation is 
sometimes required to align manager and shareholder incentives. The side payment benefits target 
shareholders in the low gains situation, because without it the target CEO may block the deal and there 
would be no premium at all. This contractual revision can be thought of as compensation for the truncation 
of the stream of returns the target CEO would otherwise be expecting from investing in firm-specific human 
capital.  
We empirically investigate our hypotheses about merger bonuses for target CEOs in a sample of 949 
publicly traded targets that receive an acquisition bid during 1999-2009. We focus on how five different 
acquisition characteristics are associated with merger bonuses: (1) the premium offered to targets, (2) the 
total synergy created by the deals, (3) the acquirer M&A announcement returns in the transactions, (4) the 
post-acquisition accounting performance of the merged firms, and (5) the division of merger gains. 
Univariate analyses show that a large fraction of the merger bonus payments given to the target CEOs 
in our sample are associated with the acquirer using the CEO in some fashion (e.g. as a consultant) or 
preventing this executive from competing against the merged firm. In terms of the shareholder wealth 
effects, our multivariate baseline tests show that in deals where the target CEO gets a merger bonus, targets 
get premiums about four percentage points lower. Consistent with the lower premiums paid for bonus-
                                                          
1 Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) recognize this issue arguing that target CEOs could be susceptible to bidder-provided 
incentives.  These eleventh hour payments are in contrast to the ex-ante severance pay agreements studied by Rao and Xu (2013). 
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paying targets, we also find that these companies appear hard to sell (e.g. they are more likely to initiate 
their own takeover and they are less likely to be pursued by multiple bidders). However, on average, we do 
not detect a transfer of wealth to bidder shareholders from target shareholders in these transactions. 
Actually, the point estimates of the effect of bonuses on acquirer performance (short term stock return and 
industry-adjusted post-merger return on assets (ROA)) are negative (-1.84% and -1.63%) and statistically 
significant. We also show that synergies are about 1.58% lower in deals in which the target CEO gets a 
merger bonus. Moreover, targets that give their CEOs a merger bonus get a larger share of the acquisition 
gains (which we compute following Ahern (2012)). These results suggest that, on average, the presence of 
merger bonuses is consistent with the contractual revision alternative.  
While we find evidence consistent with contractual revision for most acquisitions, we also find 
evidence of a transfer of wealth from target to acquirer shareholders in other takeovers with target CEO 
bonuses. Specifically, we use high abnormal accruals or SEC enforcement actions in the target firms as 
indicators of where agency problems are likely to be high, and therefore where wealth transfers from target 
shareholders are most likely to occur. In such transactions, target firms are sold for lower premiums while 
their acquirers experience higher (announcement and post-merger industry-adjusted accounting) returns 
(4% and 2.7%). Moreover, in these takeovers, targets capture a lower share of the gains. Deals with merger 
bonuses and target accounting irregularities are, therefore, particularly accretive for acquirer shareholders 
confirming the wealth transfer view (that target managers give away rents to the acquirers at the expense 
of target shareholders) in firms where agency problems are high.  
In sum, we find that most merger bonus payments are benign because they appear to revise potential 
deficiencies in existing exit compensation for CEOs that sell their firms. However, while this is the 
dominant effect, other tests indicate that some bonuses result in wealth transfers. Importantly, what enables 
these wealth transfer bonuses to exist in equilibrium is the fact that they can pool with the benign ones. 
Otherwise, if there were no benign bonuses, it would be easy for shareholders to identify and prevent wealth 
transfers by opposing takeover with merger bonuses. 
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Although we have made every effort to carefully analyze the data, some qualifications remain. First, to 
address concerns related to reverse causality, co-determination, and omitted variables bias, we use two 
different techniques to evaluate the effects and associations involving bonuses: an instrumental variable 
(IV) approach and a propensity score matching procedure (PSM). The inferences from both methods are 
similar to those arising from our baseline tests. However, both the IV and the PSM are subject to important 
limitations that may confound the results. Second, while our empirical evidence supports the contractual 
revision hypotheses, we explain in Section 5 why the results could also be consistent with alternative 
hypotheses.2 Third, because our sample includes bids for targets that are made public, we cannot know 
whether target CEOs demand merger bonuses or other benefits during negotiations in which a bid is never 
made public. Fourth, as with other studies in the accounting literature, we use high abnormal accruals or 
SEC enforcement actions as proxies for managerial opportunism, earnings management, and agency 
problems. As noted by Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010), however, these variables can also indicate benign 
characteristics that are not necessarily shareholder wealth reducing. Throughout the paper, we discuss these 
limitations in greater detail. 
Our work advances the literature on several fronts.  First, and most directly, this paper illustrates that 
merger bonuses do not generally facilitate wealth transfers from target to acquirer shareholders. Instead, 
our evidence suggests that in the typical transaction, a bonus represents a revision that improves contracting 
by aligning incentives within the target firm in response to a low synergy acquisition bid. Given this, our 
results are informative about a key role of the accounting system “because much of the motivation for 
accounting and auditing has to do with the control of incentive problems” (Lambert, 2001). Moreover, the 
findings supporting the contractual revision view contribute evidence to the theoretical literature modeling 
endogenously determined optimal wage contracts (see, for example, Hölmstrom (1979), Grossman and Hart 
(1983), and Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991)). Our results also advance an extensive empirical literature 
                                                          
2 Conformance with alternative hypotheses arises, for example, because we don’t know how certain benefits map into a target 
CEO’s utility function. Ross (2004) argues that attitudes towards risk depend not only on the convexity of an agent’s pay schedule, 
but also on how the overall schedule maps into more (or less) risk averse regions of the agent’s utility function. 
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that examines the endogenous relation between different corporate practices and firm value. In particular, 
our paper complements the results in Palia (2001). He examines the effect of incentive compensation on 
firm value and finds that taking into account the endogeneity of this compensation indicates that firms set 
managerial pay in response to their contracting environment.   
This contribution adds important evidence to the specific literature studying merger bonuses dispensed 
during acquisitions. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) find that bidding CEOs often receive a merger bonus 
regardless of whether the acquisition creates value for the acquiring shareholders. In contrast, our evidence 
is consistent with the view that a merger bonus is typically used to mitigate conflicts of interest between 
target CEOs and their shareholders. More broadly, our study expands the literature on how CEO incentives 
are related to wealth changes experienced by shareholders during acquisitions.3   
Our second contribution is to illustrate the importance of the accounting system as a control mechanism 
during acquisitions. As noted by Zimmerman (2001), well-functioning accounting systems perform a 
control function that helps motivate and monitor people in organizations to curb agency problems and self-
interested managerial actions. Our findings suggest that accounting systems usually work well in this 
control function to achieve goal congruence between managers and outside shareholders, even when a firm 
receives a takeover bid.  In high synergy bids, contingencies written into the usual compensation contracts 
help achieve congruence; in low synergy bids, an added merger bonus that revises the contract enables 
congruence. On the other hand, our evidence about accounting irregularities (high abnormal accruals and 
SEC enforcement actions) shows that noise in the accounting system is likely to be related to agency 
problems. In general, therefore, our findings show that the integrity and quality of the financial reporting 
system affects investment efficiency. In this regard, our paper advances the literature examining the impact 
of accounting on investment efficiency (e.g., Bens and Monahan, 2004; Biddle and Hilary, 2006; 
McNichols and Stubben, 2008; Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi, 2009; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith, 2011; Ge 
and Lennox, 2011; Kravet, 2014). 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985), Tehranian, Travlos, and Waegelein (1987), Lambert and Larcker 
(1988), Grinstein and Hribar (2004), and Harford and Li (2007). 
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Third, our paper adds additional evidence related to a question dating back to Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and posed by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) – “… why don’t investors try to bribe the manager with 
cash … not to undertake the inefficient project?”  The Shleifer and Vishny paper argues that commonly, 
and inconsistent with Coase (1960), investors do not engage in such bribes for individual actions, and the 
result is some ex post inefficiency.  Our evidence suggests that merger bonuses can serve as the “bribing” 
mechanism to get closer to ex post efficiency and discourage managers from taking the inefficient action 
of preventing a merger that provides some benefit to shareholders.  Perhaps this bonus mechanism is used 
here because the merger represents a final transaction between the target firm and the manager; therefore 
there is no threat of extorting bribes later by proposing similar inefficient actions.   
Finally, our paper adds important information to the public policy discussion related to recent changes 
in securities laws that explicitly allow target firms to give merger bonuses and other benefits to their 
executives during takeovers.4 From an academic perspective, our findings on bonuses demonstrate that 
examining individual components of the merger pay package to target CEOs reveals critical facts about the 
deal and about the impact of specific benefits. In this vein, our findings add to the literature examining the 
role of individual merger-related benefits given to target CEOs during M&A deals. Papers in this area study 
the effect of target CEOs that (i) negotiate shared control in the merged firm (Wulf, 2004), (ii) receive a 
bundle of merger-related benefits that may include an augmentation of their golden parachute (Hartzell, 
Ofek, and Yermack, 2004), (iii) join the corporate board of the merged company (Moeller, 2005), (iv) 
accept a job in the acquirer firm (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2010), and (v) obtain 
unscheduled stock options during private merger negotiations (Fich, Cai, and Tran, 2011). 
                                                          
4 On October 18, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) unanimously approved amendments to Rule 14d-10(a) (2) 
(commonly known as the “best price” rule) applicable to tender offers for securities registered under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. This rule was originally written to ensure equal treatment among target shareholders by requiring the highest consideration 
paid to any one security holder in a class be the consideration paid to all security holders in the same class. The amendments 
expressly state that the best price rule does not apply to payments to top managers, directors, or other employees of a target company 
entered into in connection with an acquisition of the target. The amendments now enable the target’s board of directors to approve 
cash bonuses, severance, or other employee benefit arrangements for its executives during an acquisition negotiation.  
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses and describes their empirical 
predictions. Section 3 describes our data and the merger bonuses awarded to target CEOs. Section 4 presents 
our empirical analyses. Section 5 contains additional tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Hypothesis development and empirical predictions 
2.1. The wealth transfer hypothesis 
Lambert and Larcker’s (1985) study of golden parachutes (GPs) examines whether these merger-
contingent payments, which insulate target managers against personal losses, lead to inefficient outcomes 
for target shareholders. Lambert and Larcker (1985) refer to this possibility as the wealth transfer 
hypothesis whereby target shareholders give up rents during a takeover.5 Lambert and Larcker (1985, p. 
186) warn “…since GPs have the potential to decrease the discipline on managers, the wealth transfer 
hypothesis predicts that GP adoption should have an adverse impact on [target] shareholder wealth.” Under 
the wealth transfer hypothesis in Lambert and Larcker’s setting, rents are transferred from target 
shareholders and captured by the target CEOs.  
Since Lambert and Larcker’s study, the literature has evolved to include the acquirer shareholders as 
potential recipients of the wealth transferred from the target. This is of particular concern when the target 
CEO obtains acquisition-contingent benefits (like bonuses) often required by the bidder.  Moeller (2005, p. 
168-169) notes that “…one way to solicit a target CEO’s merger approval at a reduced takeover price is for 
the bidder to offer private benefits to the target CEO …”  The evidence in Moeller suggests that some target 
CEOs negotiate lucrative deals for themselves by enabling bidding shareholders to capture additional rents 
from the target shareholders. Likewise, Wulf (2004, p.60) concludes, “…CEOs trade power for premium 
by negotiating shared control,” in mergers of equals.  Her evidence also indicates that in these mergers the 
acquirer firms exhibit significantly larger returns. Similarly, in reference to different bundles of merger 
                                                          
5 Rosen (1985) argues that the “wealth transfer hypothesis” is essentially moral hazard. Other papers in the literature refer to this 
hypothesis as “rent extraction,” “managerial discretion,” or “managerial interest” (see, for example, Malatesta and Walkling (1998), 
Grinstein and Hribar (2004), and Moeller (2005)).  
7 
benefits given to target CEOs, Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004, p. 59) argue, “… the financial cost to 
target shareholders of these arrangements would seem to exceed substantially the benefits received by their 
CEOs.6 This imbalance, arising from a conflict of interest between target CEOs and their shareholders, 
would seem to represent a wealth transfer from shareholders of the target to shareholders of the buyer.” 
Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) argue that unscheduled options given to target CEOs during M&A negotiations 
transfer wealth to acquirers. In our setting, the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts that merger bonus 
payments represent moral hazard where the target CEO’s self-interest persuades him or her to deliver the 
target to the acquirer at a low premium.   
 
2.2. The contractual revision hypothesis 
Our alternative to the wealth transfer hypothesis is the contractual revision hypothesis, which holds 
that a side payment in case of a takeover bid can circumvent potential conflicts of interests. In this situation, 
an extra benefit provided during an acquisition attempt on the firm is a choice variable that maximizes the 
target firm’s value given its operating and information environment as well as the reservation wage and 
future career opportunities of the target CEO.  
The logic of the contractual revision view begins with the recognition that the incentives of target CEOs 
and target shareholders in an acquisition decision often differ ex ante, before considering special provisions 
in compensation contracts. Target CEOs are concerned about the impact of the acquisition on their overall 
personal wealth including private benefits, the present value of future compensation, and their current 
shareholdings. Target shareholders, on the other hand, are concerned almost exclusively about the financial 
value of their shares. Most firms write compensation contracts that assure that this ex ante potential conflict 
of interest will not forestall target-value-increasing merger bids with typical levels of premiums. Some of 
these contracts use equity-based pay, golden parachutes and the like so that incentives to accept bids are 
roughly aligned. When these provisions work effectively, both target managers and their outside 
                                                          
6 In contrast to the results in Hartzell et al., Patrick (2014) does not find an association between changes in target shareholders’ 
wealth and the renegotiation of the target CEOs’ personal benefits. 
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shareholders share in the gains that accrue from a value-increasing takeover bid and no bonus is required 
to generate goal congruence. 
When the synergies between the target and a potential acquirer are relatively low, however, manager 
and shareholder incentives to accept bids may not be aligned.  In this case, the premium that the acquirer 
will offer will be low and therefore any gains to the target manager through equity incentives will be low. 
Furthermore, the cost to the CEO in future wages will be high because of the signal involved in selling the 
firm for a low premium.7  
Thus, when synergies are low but positive, target managers are more likely to oppose outside-
shareholder-wealth-increasing deals. This misalignment can cause wealth reductions for all parties if it 
prompts the target CEO to fend off a value-increasing offer.  
Bonuses in this case may resolve the potential conflict of interest between the CEO and shareholders.  
In this situation, an extra cash benefit provided during an acquisition attempt can move the target CEO to 
support and enable a deal the CEO would otherwise oppose. In these circumstances, shareholders in low 
synergy targets also benefit because they are paid a premium they would have not otherwise received. In 
essence, therefore, such a low synergy transaction is worth inducing with a contractual revision because the 
resulting ex post contract enables targets to achieve their highest value.  
Our alternative view also ties the use of a merger bonus as an inducement, as opposed to equity-value-
based side payments, directly to low synergies.  Because the premium paid for a low synergy target is small, 
the appreciation accruing to equity-based pay will be small. Therefore, all else equal, an unusually large 
amount of stock or options would be required to get buy-in from the target CEO. In such a scenario, a cash 
bonus provides a more practical way to deliver a payment in order to get the target CEO’s support for the 
deal. The bonus, therefore, enables target CEOs to partly recover their firm specific human capital 
investment. 
                                                          
7 Martin and McConnell (1991) show that CEOs of underperforming firms that are sold often have trouble getting future 
employment. 
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2.3. Predictions of the main hypotheses 
The wealth transfer hypothesis and the contractual revision hypothesis have different predictions about 
both the causes and consequences of merger bonuses.  In developing our predictions, we recognize that 
there will likely be different motivations and effects of bonuses in different transactions. Our predictions 
are therefore about average relations.  Also, sometimes one or the other hypothesis lacks an explicit 
prediction about the direction of a particular effect while other times the direction of a particular effect will 
be the same under both hypotheses.8 Because of these issues and to conserve space, we focus on the 
unambiguous predictions that potentially distinguish between our hypotheses.  
 
The contractual revision hypothesis is predicated on low synergy deals giving rise to bonuses.  Low 
synergies limit the premium that buyers will be willing to pay.  Therefore, we expect bonuses to be 
associated with both low premiums and lesser synergies. The wealth transfer hypothesis also predicts low 
premiums where merger bonuses occur, but here the premiums are a direct result of agency problems rather 
than low synergies.  Thus, both hypotheses predict that acquisitions with merger bonuses involve lower 
premiums paid to the target firm.  Importantly, only the contractual revision hypothesis predicts the 
following. 
 
Prediction 1 (contractual revision): Acquisitions with merger bonuses involve lower 
overall synergies. 
 
The wealth transfer hypothesis highlights the role of a bonus in generating extra wealth for the acquiring 
firm’s shareholders, because agency problems lead target managers to transfer wealth to the acquirers at 
their own shareholders’ expense.  This hypothesis therefore implies that acquirer abnormal returns should 
                                                          
8 Both hypotheses predict that merger bonuses are more prevalent and larger where the target CEO is more entrenched. According 
to the contractual revision hypothesis, bonuses are more prevalent or larger when the CEO’s incentives to accept a bid differ 
significantly from those of target shareholders. Such a situation is likely to arise when the target CEO is more entrenched and thus 
likely to lose more private benefits from a takeover. The wealth transfer hypothesis also predicts bonuses where there is 
entrenchment, because in target firms with agency problems CEOs have undue power over their boards. 
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be higher in deals with merger bonuses to target CEOs, and we would expect the share of the gains from 
the merger to be lower for the target in these same deals.   
Prediction 2 (wealth transfer): An acquirer’s abnormal returns in bids associated with 
target merger bonuses are higher than the abnormal returns associated with other bids. 
 
Prediction 3 (wealth transfer): A target firm’s relative gains from a merger deal with target 
merger bonuses are lower than the relative gains associated with other deals. 
 
 
In the work that follows, we first establish that, consistent with both hypotheses, merger deals with 
bonuses involve higher target firm entrenchment and lower premiums paid.  We then develop findings 
related to our three predictions. We find in our overall sample that the evidence does not support the key 
predictions of the wealth transfer hypothesis but is consistent with the contractual revision alternative. 
  
 
3. Data and Variable Definitions 
 In this section, we provide descriptive statistics for the sample we use and present information related 
to the merger bonuses given to target CEOs in the transactions we study. 
 
3.1. Acquisition sample 
We begin with 4,455 merger and acquisition (M&A) bids tracked by the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) announced during 1999-2009 in which the target is a publicly traded U.S. company.9 This initial 
sample excludes spinoffs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, self-tenders, privatizations, 
acquisitions of remaining interest, partial interests or assets, and transactions for which deal value is not 
disclosed. We retain 3,807 deals in which targets have stock market and accounting data available from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. We drop 324 bids due to the 
lack of acquisition premium data from SDC or other sources, which results in 3,483 deals. From this set, 
we keep 1,156 observations that have corporate governance data for the target companies available from 
                                                          
9 Our M&A sample starts in 1999 because we require previous option granting activity (from the Thomson Financial’s Insiders 
Filing database which starts in 1996) to establish each target CEO’s option granting pattern. The sample stops in 2009 to enable us 
to use accounting data after deal completion to examine post-acquisition operating performance. 
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RiskMetrics. We discard 207 observations for which deal background and target CEO exit compensation 
arrangement information is not available from either the merger proxy filed by the target and/or acquirer 
with the SEC or from news event searches in Lexis/Nexis. These criteria yield our final sample of 949 
deals. 
In Panel A of Table 1, we report the temporal and industrial distribution of the 949 sample targets. The 
industrial distribution of our targets, which follows the classification in Fama and French (1997), mirrors 
the industrial distribution of targets in SDC during our sample period.10 The annual number of mergers 
announced is higher at the beginning of our sample period, which coincides with times of economic 
expansion. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that stock market health drives merger activity. Consistent 
with this, the incidence of mergers declines during the periods of economic weakness that occur during 
2002-2003 and again in 2009.  
Panel B of Table 1 reports the completion rate, mode of acquisition, method of payment, attitude, and 
other characteristics related to the deals we examine. The Appendix contains the definitions for these 
characteristics as well as for all other variables used in the paper. Transactions in our sample are completed 
almost 82% of the time and tender offers account for 18% of the sample. These statistics are comparable to 
those in Officer (2003). He reports a completion rate of 83% and a tender offer proportion of 20% in his 
merger sample during 1988-2000. We note that about 54% of bids in our sample are cash deals. Bates and 
Lemmon (2003) study mergers during 1989-1998 and find that 47% of the deals are paid in cash. We find 
that 89% of transactions in our sample consist of so-called friendly mergers. This frequency also resembles 
that in Bates and Lemmon (2003).  
We read the S-4, DEFM 14, SC 14D9, SC TO, DEF 14, and 8-K filed by the acquirer and/or target 
firms with the SEC and find that in over 36% of our transactions, the target firm initiates the deal. This 
                                                          
10 Specifically, for almost all industries, the percentage of our sample is quite similar to that in SDC. For example, 0.39 vs. 0.42 in 
Agriculture, 1.32 vs. 1.58 in Food Products, 0.93 vs. 0.95 in Apparel, 1.30 vs. 1.37 in Healthcare, 3.48 vs. 3.27 in Medical 
Equipment, 0.64 vs. 0.74 in Rubber & Plastic, 2.12 vs. 2.42 in Machinery, 0.09 vs. 0.11 in Defense, 0.27 vs. 0.21 in Precious 
Metals, 3.39 vs. 3.37 in Communications, 4.34 vs. 4.32 in Computer Hardware, 4.89 vs. 4.52 in Computer Software, 2.07 vs. 2.32 
in Transportation, and 2.68 vs. 2.95 in Wholesale. The difference in proportions between our sample and SDC is not statistically 
significant for any of these industries. 
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incidence is close to that of 42% reported in the sample of deals occurring during 1994-2006 studied by 
Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010). The bidder is from the same Fama and French (1997) industry as the target 
in 54% of our sample. For the same variable, Officer (2004) reports an incidence of 53%. Deals in our 
sample exhibit an average value of $4.611 billion. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) also report a large mean 
deal value of $4.7 billion for transactions in their sample of acquisitions during 1993-1999.  
Table 1, Panel B also reports key firm characteristics for the target firms in our sample. The average 
(median) target has a market capitalization of $3.251 billion ($0.991) and a market-to-book ratio of 2.792 
(1.976). On average, targets in our sample exhibit a leverage ratio of 0.258. For the same ratio, Bates and 
Lemmon (2003) report a mean value of 0.233 for the targets they study. The average premium offered to 
the targets in our sample is 34.73%, which is close to the 34.8% premium paid for the targets analyzed in 
Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004). As with the average synergy of 0.97% reported by Wang and Xie 
(2009), deals in our sample exhibit a mean synergy of 1.03%. Our bidder firms are met with average M&A 
announcement returns of -3.17% which match Moeller’s (2005) average of -2.91% for the same variable. 
Ahern (2012) calculates the surplus obtained by the target as the difference in dollar gains between the 
target and the acquirer divided by the sum of their market values. He finds that the target’s share of the 
M&A gains vs. the acquirer’s share is, on average, 3.52%; for the same variable we estimate an average of 
4.88%. Overall, the descriptive statistics of deals and targets in our sample appear in line with those reported 
in the previous literature. 
 
3.2. Merger bonuses 
We also read the different merger-related filings by either the target or the acquirer with the SEC to 
identify whether the target firm awards its CEO a merger bonus. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics related 
to merger bonuses given to target CEOs in the deals we study. According to the information in Panel A of 
Table 2, 219 target CEOs (or about 23%) receive a merger bonus.11 Within this group, 29 CEOs have a 
                                                          
11 This incidence is comparable to that in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004). 
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merger bonus clause in their compensation contract when they are first hired by the target firm. We 
categorize the description given for the merger bonus in the proxy filings and report this information in 
Panel B of Table 2. Most target boards justify these payments as “consulting” fees (59 cases), 
“noncompetition” agreements (41 cases), “signing” consents (6 cases) or “management” (1 case) as 
required by the buyer. Other target firms categorize these payments as “retention” (58 cases), “special” (8 
cases), “stay” (3 cases), “termination” (6 cases), “transition” (2 cases) or “separation” (1 case) made in 
consideration of the annulment of the CEO’s employment agreement. The remaining boards award these 
payments in order to acknowledge the target CEO’s leadership in executing the transaction. In these 
instances, the payments are described as “bonus” (20 cases), “merger” (17 cases), “transaction” (11 cases), 
or “special recognition” (1 case). The reasons for the merger bonus add to more than 219 because, in many 
instances, target firms use more than one rationale to justify this benefit. 
For the 219 cases in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus, we report summary statistics of 
the cash paid for this benefit. This information appears in Panel C of Table 2. Relative to the median 
transaction value for deals in our sample (over $1.5 billion), merger bonuses appear to be quite modest. On 
average, these payments amount to about $1.6 million with a maximum value of $12 million. 
 
4. Empirical Analyses 
In order to distinguish among our hypotheses, we perform several tests aimed at examining the causes 
and consequences of merger bonuses awarded to target CEOs. 
 
4.1. Which target firms give their CEOs merger bonuses?  
To explore the characteristics of firms that provide a merger bonus in our sample of 949 targets, we run 
three regressions of the determinants of these benefits and report the results in Table 3. In the logit 
regression reported as model (1), we set the dependent variable to one if the target is among the 219 firms 
with a merger bonus and set it to zero otherwise. In the ordinary least squares regression (OLS) we report 
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as model (2), the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the merger bonus value.12  In model (3), we 
estimate a tobit regression in which the dependent variable is the dollar value of the merger bonus scaled 
by the total compensation the target CEO receives in the year prior to the acquisition announcement.13  All 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects and for other variables that we define in the Appendix. 
Because other components of the merger pay package to the target CEO might be simultaneously negotiated 
with the bonus, our tests control for other benefits such as golden parachutes, unscheduled stock options, 
and a job in the merged firm. Other control variables (e.g. CEOs near retirement age and CEO stock 
ownership) are similar to those in Hartzell et al. (2004).14 
Table 3 provides evidence that entrenched target CEOs are more likely to receive merger bonuses. The 
first variable we employ to study this issue indicates target CEOs that also hold the title of “Chairman of 
the Board.” Our use of this variable as a measure of entrenchment is rooted in the argument by Adams, 
Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) that the accumulation of titles (or roles) by CEOs often signals excessive 
managerial power. Nonetheless, being the board’s chairman could also identify CEOs with higher skills 
that are well suited for the dual role. Based on the estimates in model (1), target CEOs who also chair their 
boards are 7.53 percentage points more likely to get a merger bonus.15 Likewise, a one point increase in the 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) entrenchment index (E-index) increases the likelihood of getting a 
merger bonus by 2.99 percentage points.  
In addition, to measure the influence of the target CEO over the compensation committee we define a 
dummy variable which we label “handpicked compensation committee.” This variable, defined following 
Fich, Starks, and Yore (2014), is set to one whenever the CEO has been in office longer than the majority 
of the members in the compensation committee. As such, handpicked compensation committees might 
                                                          
12 The dependent variable in model (2) is set to zero if the target CEO does not a get a merger bonus. 
13  In untabulated tests, we also scale the bonus by the target’s market value of equity. All results continue to obtain. 
14 Controlling for CEOs near retirement is important given the horizon problem documented in the literature (see, for example, 
Dechow and Sloan (1991)). 
15 We calculate the marginal effects as follows. First, we estimate the probability of having a merger bonus using zeros for all 
bivariate independent variables and using the sample means for all continuous independent variables. Second, we recalculate that 
probability by changing the value of the independent variable of interest one at a time.  
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proxy for both cronyism and managerial entrenchment. On the other hand, handpicking might be proxying 
for highly skilled managers that can preserve their employment longer. 
The results in Table 3 indicate that target CEOs are 5.65 percentage points more likely to get a merger 
bonus when the board’s compensation committee is handpicked. In line with the wealth transfer view, this 
last result suggests that target CEOs are able to extract additional acquisition-related benefits (in this case 
a merger bonus) when they control their board’s compensation committee. But at the same time, a 
compensation committee giving a merger bonus to the target CEO could simply reflect the fact that these 
committees set pay according to the expected tenure of the CEO (see, Huson, Tian, Wiedman, and Wier 
(2011)). This alternative, which is consistent with the contractual revision hypothesis, supports the view in 
Lowry and Murphy (2007) that CEOs do not always influence executive compensation decisions for self-
dealing purposes.  
Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2015) find that cash targets experience a revaluation that becomes 
permanent in the event the deal is withdrawn. They argue that cash offers (but not stock offers) reflect 
positive news about the stand-alone value of the target which suggests that non-cash targets are of low 
quality relative to cash targets. The results in Table 3 document an inverse association between the Cash 
payment (0,1) indicator and all of our bonus proxies. According to the estimates in model (1), the probability 
of getting a merger bonus decreases by 7.69 percentage points when the transaction is structured as an all 
cash deal.  
Panel B of Table 2 shows that many target CEOs’ compensation contracts are adjusted with a merger 
bonus to possibly stop these executives from competing against the merged firm. Therefore, in Table 3, we 
control for whether non-competition agreements are enforceable in the state in which the acquisition takes 
place with a variable based on an index proposed by Garmaise (2011).16 Notably, according to model (1), 
                                                          
16 Garmaise proposes an enforceability index which is based on 12 questions analyzed by Malsberger (2004). For each jurisdiction, 
Garmaise assigns 1 point for each question if the jurisdiction’s enforcement of that dimension of noncompetition law exceeds a 
given threshold. Possible totals therefore range from 0 to 12 where a higher value denotes a higher level of enforceability. Garmaise 
argues that laws governing the enforcement of non-competition agreements are largely static. Nonetheless, one major change during 
our sample period occurs during 2002-2003 whereby non-compete agreements become less enforceable in Louisiana due to changes 
in the laws protecting intellectual property rights in that state.  
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an increase of one unit in the non-compete index is associated with a 2.02 percentage point increase in the 
probability that the target CEO gets a merger bonus. This finding suggests that target firms are more likely 
to give their CEOs a merger bonus in jurisdictions where a related non-compete agreement can be enforced.  
In a theoretical study about golden parachutes, Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) view parachutes as 
implicit deferred compensation, already earned but not yet received, that promotes managerial human 
capital investment in the firm. Our contracting revision hypothesis suggests that the merger bonus helps 
target CEOs recoup their firm specific human capital investment. Given this, one would expect that bonuses 
should be more prevalent when parachutes are small or not provided. This is what we find. We note that 
Table 3 documents an inverse and statistically significant association between bonuses and parachute 
provisions. The estimates in model (1) imply that a drop of one standard deviation in parachute value 
increases the probability of a bonus by 1.11 percentage points. The parachute estimate in model (2) indicates 
that a $1 decline in the parachute payment raises the bonus by $0.67. This evidence indicates that golden 
parachutes and merger bonuses are substitutes and reinforces the idea in the contractual revision hypothesis 
that bonuses are given to circumvent potential problems with ex-ante compensation contracts.17 Moreover, 
the inverse association between parachutes and bonuses implies that the latter are not determined in 
isolation, but instead negotiated simultaneously with the rest of the target CEO’s merger pay package. This 
suggests that simply controlling for the other pay package elements in a subsequent test might be 
insufficient or inappropriate. To address this issue, we complement the remaining multivariate tests with 
systems of equations analyses in which the merger bonus is instrumented from a first stage regression 
similar to model (1) in Table 3.  
 
4.2. Empirical strategy 
In the tests that follow, we use four different metrics for the merger bonus as independent variables. 
The first is a (0,1) dummy variable set to one if the target CEO receives a merger bonus. The second proxy 
                                                          
17 We also investigate the role of very large parachutes later in Section 5.6. 
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is the natural logarithm of the merger bonus payment. The third is the dollar value of the merger bonus 
scaled by the total compensation the target CEO receives in the year prior to the acquisition announcement.  
Our fourth proxy is the fitted bonus dummy from a first stage regression (model (1) in Table 3). In that 
first stage test, we use the index of the enforceability of non-compete agreements by state proposed by 
Garmaise (2011) as an instrument. The results in Table 3, in which the coefficient for the index is 
statistically different from zero, indicate that this variable satisfies the relevance condition.18  
In terms of the exclusion restriction, we believe that the enforceability of non-compete agreements is 
orthogonal to takeover premiums, synergies, or acquisition return outcomes. This view is supported by 
Garmaise’s (2011, p. 414) conclusion that “the enforceability of non-competition agreements has no net 
effect on firm value.”  
It is important to note what the exclusion restriction in our tests requires and what it doesn’t.  What it 
requires is that the enforceability of a non-compete agreement not influence the change in value to any of 
the parties to a merger.  One way to achieve this is if non-compete agreement enforceability has no influence 
on the level of firm value.  With this “strong” condition holding, the value of the combined firms both 
before and after a merger are independent of enforceability, and therefore the change in value is also 
independent of the enforceability. This strong condition, which is one interpretation of what Garmaise finds, 
is sufficient (but not necessary) for our exclusion restriction to be met.  
Importantly, however, there are weaker conditions where enforceability may not influence the change 
in value, even though it might influence the level of value itself. Garmaise (2011) discusses several potential 
effects of enforcing non-compete agreements on firms, and while these effects may change in importance 
when a merger occurs, they may also roughly cancel out in their impact on deal values. Specifically, for 
many of our targets (particularly those with poor performance), the alternative to a takeover would be to 
remove the CEO. Whether the CEO is removed by a merger or not, the enforceability of a non-compete 
                                                          
18 The first-stage χ2 is large, indicating that our estimation is efficient. Furthermore, the F-statistic on the instrument in our first 
stage is above critical values from a Stock-Yogo weak identification test. We employ the methods outlined by Stock and Watson 
(2010) and by Hall and Peixe (2003) to test the validity of our instrument and ensure that the relevance condition is satisfied. 
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agreement should have an equal value effect on the firm whether it is acquired or survives as a stand-alone 
entity. To clarify further, the ex-ante pricing of the target firm’s stock will have a discount for the lack of 
enforceability of a non-compete agreement before any merger bid, because of the expected CEO removal. 
Similarly, the post-merger-bid pricing of the stock should include an offsetting discount for the lack of 
enforceability of a non-compete agreement, because of the expected CEO departure.  In either case, the 
CEO will be expected to be leaving and enforceability of a non-compete agreement will therefore have the 
same effect on value. Consequently, the enforceability of non-compete agreements should not directly 
affect target premiums, synergies, or acquirer returns in this case.   
Nevertheless, since other scenarios are possible and the exclusion restriction is not testable, we 
recognize that our IV method and our arguments to justify the exclusion restriction might not be completely 
convincing. Therefore, in Section 4.7, we use propensity score matching techniques to estimate the effect 
of the merger bonus and evaluate the robustness of all the findings related to our instrumental variables 
(IV) regressions.  
 
4.3. Merger bonuses and acquisition premiums 
In Table 4, we test the association between merger bonuses to target CEOs and the bid premiums 
received by their firms.  We estimate four regressions with year- and industry-fixed effects using the four-
week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable and the four proxies for the merger bonus 
(described above) as the respective key independent variables.19 Our target premium tests closely follow 
the specification in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010).  
We note that the estimates for several control variables in Table 4 are in agreement with the existing 
M&A literature. For example, we find acquisition premiums to be higher in deals characterized as tender 
offers (Huang and Walkling, 1987) and in all cash transactions (Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi, 2015). 
Premiums also increase with the existence of a target termination fee (Bates and Lemmon, 2003, and 
                                                          
19 Following Officer (2003), we limit the premium to values between 0 and 2 (or 200%). 
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Officer, 2003). In contrast, acquisition premiums are inversely related to the size of the target firm, also 
decline when the bidder is a private company (Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter, 2010), and when 
the transaction is characterized as a merger of equals (Wulf, 2004, and Wang and Xie, 2009).  
The premium tests in Table 4 control for target initiated deals because the findings in Aktas, de Bodt, 
and Roll (2010) suggest that this variable is a reasonable proxy for the target’s bargaining power. The 
results in Table 4 suggest that bargaining power affects the gains to target shareholders in mergers: bid 
premiums are about 3.07% to 3.27% lower in deals initiated by the target firm. This result agrees with those 
in Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011). They also document an inverse association between acquisition premiums 
and target initiated deals.  
More importantly, the merger bonus coefficients in all models of Table 4 document an economically 
important inverse association between this benefit and takeover premiums. According to the estimates in 
model (1), the presence of a bonus is associated with a decline in premium of 4.3 percentage points. Such 
a decline implies a drop of about $207 million in terms of deal value. Similarly, according to the estimates 
in model (2), every $1 increase in the merger bonus lowers deal value by about $11. Thus, although the 
merger bonus is quite small relative to the average deal size, it is associated with a disproportionately large 
premium decline.20  
Using our aforementioned IV approach, in Table 4 we address the possibility of co-determination of 
merger bonuses and takeover premiums. The IV approach also reduces concerns related to the possibility 
of omitted variables in our specification. Mitigating these concerns could be particularly important because 
we theorize that, in somewhat unobservable ways associated with anticipated synergies, eventual 
                                                          
20 In recent empirical work, Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012) revisit well established findings in the corporate governance 
literature related to the association between board size and firm performance and also between board independence and 
performance. Wintoki et al. (2012) find that the inverse and significant association between board size and performance 
documented by Yermack (1996) and others is not robust to controls for different lags of performance. Similarly, those authors also 
find that board independence (Weisbach, 1988) is no longer significantly related to firm performance once performance lags are 
used as additional explanatory variables. Wintoki et al. argue that their findings illustrate an often ignored source of endogeneity 
in the literature: that current observations of the key explanatory variable (board size or board independence in their analyses) are 
not independent of past values of the (performance) dependent variables. In our case and following the rationale in Wintoki et al., 
it is possible that the merger bonus the target CEO receives is not independent of previous firm performance. To investigate this 
issue, in untabulated analyses we re-estimate the target premium regressions reported in Table 4 including three lags of annual 
stock performance. These tests show that the inverse association between the bonus and the premium is robust to controls for 
different lags of target firm performance. 
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compensation losses, and the target CEOs’ utility functions, bonuses align the incentives of these executives 
with those of their shareholders.  
In the last column of Table 4 and in all other tests in which the fitted bonus is used as the independent 
variable, the standard errors are adjusted due to the instrumentation. For this purpose (and because the 
regression for the presence of a merger bonus is a logit model), we follow the procedure outlined by 
Maddala (1983, p. 244-245). Consistent with the results from the other regressions in Table 4, the 
coefficient on the instrumented bonus variable is statistically significant with an estimate of -4.33%.  All 
of this evidence is consistent with both of our hypotheses, which predict that premiums should be inversely 
related to the presence (and size) of a merger bonus. 
 
4.4. Merger bonuses and acquisition synergies 
To test Prediction 1 of the contractual revision hypothesis (that synergies are lower where merger 
bonuses are given), we estimate four regressions of the acquisition synergies for the 497 transactions in our 
sample where the bidder is a publicly traded firm.21 These tests, which are reported in Table 5, follow those 
in Wang and Xie (2009) and include year and industry fixed effects. As in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), 
the dependent variable in all models is the total percentage synergistic gain from acquisitions (or merger 
synergy). We compute this variable as the three day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a value-
weighted portfolio of the acquirer and the target around the merger announcement date.22 This CAR is 
calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window ending four weeks 
prior to the merger announcement. The independent variables of interest in the four regressions reported in 
Table 5 are our four merger bonus proxies, respectively.  
                                                          
21 The proportion of public acquirers that bid for a public target in our sample is 497 / 949 = 52%. This is close to the incidence of 
public acquirers that we can infer from the tests in Bates and Lemmon (2003). They run target return tests for all public targets as 
well as bidder return regressions for subsamples of public acquirers. Based on the number of observations they report, we estimate 
that the proportion of public bidders in their data is 57% to 59%.  
22 When necessary, we adjust for the percentage of target shares held by the bidder two days prior to the merger announcement. 
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The parameter estimates related to our control variables in Table 5 yield results that agree with those 
in the existing literature. For example, the inferences related to statistically significant variables such as 
bidder size, cash payment (0,1), and merger of equals (0,1), are similar to those in Wang and Xie (2009).  
The results associated with our key independent variables document an inverse association between all 
of our proxies for the merger bonus and the synergy gains. According to the coefficient estimate in model 
(1), the presence of a merger bonus is associated with a 1.58% decline in synergies.  These results are 
therefore consistent with Prediction 1 and the contractual revision hypothesis.   
 
4.5. Merger bonuses and acquirer returns 
In this section, we analyze the returns to acquirers to test Prediction 2.  Under this prediction and 
according to the wealth transfer hypothesis, both short- and long-run returns should be higher when the 
target CEO receives a merger bonus. 
 
4.5.1. Acquisition announcement returns 
To analyze the possible effect of merger bonuses on acquirer returns, we use the standard event-study 
methodology to estimate the three-day market model-adjusted CAR centered on the announcement of the 
acquisition and accruing to the 497 publicly traded buyers in our sample. As before, the market model is 
estimated during the one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. Table 6 reports 
four OLS regressions using this CAR as the dependent variable and the four merger bonus proxies as the 
respective key explanatory variables. All regressions control for various deal, market, and bidder 
characteristics similar to those in the acquirer return regressions estimated in Moeller, Schlingemann, and 
Stulz (2004) and in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007).  
Looking at the control variables in Table 6, we note that several produce results that conform to the 
existing literature. For example, as in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), the relative size variable yields 
negative estimates. In addition, similar to Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), bidder size is inversely 
22 
related to the acquirer return. As in Malmendier, Opp, and Saidi (2015) acquirer returns are higher when 
cash is used to buy the target firm. 
The estimates for the merger bonus variables in all regression models reported in Table 6 are negative 
and statistically significant. The coefficient for the merger bonus dummy in model (1) indicates that 
acquirer returns decline by 1.84% when deals include this benefit. The results from our second stage IV 
regression reported in the last column of Table 6 indicate a more severe acquirer return reduction of 2.30%. 
Because the acquirer is paying for the bonus, there is a natural negative relation between this benefit and 
the acquirer’s return. Nonetheless, the size of the bonus itself cannot explain much of the acquirer CAR. 
Indeed, according to the estimates in model (2) of Table 6, a $1 increase in the merger bonus is associated 
with a decline of about $52 (on average) in the bidder’s market capitalization. Inconsistent with Prediction 
2, the evidence in Table 6 documents an inverse association between merger bonuses to target CEOs and 
the M&A announcement returns accruing to their acquirers. 
 
4.5.2. Accounting returns to mergers 
We now perform a test based on an ex-post (long-run) accounting measure of performance. The 
advantage of this approach is that it provides evidence based on accounting realizations rather than on future 
expectations embedded in market data. Consequently, our operating gain to mergers tests are unlikely to be 
biased by either market sentiment or investors’ perceptions.23 
In Table 7, we estimate four OLS regressions of the operating gains to mergers, calculated as the mean 
industry-adjusted ROA over the three-year post-merger period. These regressions examine the 417 
completed deals made by U.S. public bidders in our sample. Our operating gains to mergers tests follow 
                                                          
23 This test is also useful because we are concerned that the market reaction may not be the best place to look for the synergy value 
when the offer price is low. That is, following the theory in Shleifer and Vishny (2003), it is possible that target shareholders accept 
a low offer because they believe the synergies are low (and thus the market reaction is low). In such a scenario, the acquirer could 
be getting a good deal –and the target CEO may have needed a side payment (such as a merger bonus) to let this happen– it is just 
the market that does not know. This lack of knowledge could explain the lower announcement returns to the acquirer firms in these 
deals. In fact, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) model a case in which a similar situation happens: the short-run CEO is “paid” to sell the 
company for less than it is worth in the long-run and the market does not notice. 
23 
those in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and in Harford, Humphrey-Jenner, and Powell (2012). Our tests 
control for, among other things, pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA which we estimate as the combined 
acquirer-target industry-adjusted ROA for the fiscal year before the takeover. We augment the specification 
used in previous studies by including our merger bonus proxies as additional control variables. 
As in Harford et al. (2012), the coefficient estimate for pre-merger industry-adjusted ROA is positive 
and significant. More importantly, all of our merger bonus variables exhibit significantly negative 
estimates. According to the merger bonus indicator in model (1), over the three years following the deal, 
the industry-adjusted operating performance of the merged firm declines by 1.63% relative to deals without 
bonuses. The second-stage IV regression suggests a sharper decline of 2.11%.24 
Together with the target premium results, those in Tables 6 and 7 show that in many transactions 
acquirers of targets that provide their CEOs a merger bonus are paying less for the target but are not 
capturing rents from the shareholders of the firms they buy. In fact, the performance of these acquirers is 
worse in deals where bonuses exist, in terms of both stock market returns and accounting performance. 
These results contradict Prediction 2 of the wealth transfer hypothesis. 
 
4.6. Merger bonuses and the division of gains during acquisitions 
In this section, we test Prediction 3 related to share of the gains to target firms from a merger deal 
where target CEO bonuses are used.  To ascertain how value is shared, we follow the procedure in Ahern 
(2012). Specifically, in Table 8 we estimate four regressions in which the dependent variable is the target’s 
gain relative to the acquirer’s gain. To construct this variable we first estimate the target $CAR and the 
acquirer $CAR as the cumulative abnormal return earned over three days (centered on the merger 
announcement date) adjusted by the equally weighted CRSP index and then multiplied by the market equity 
of the firm two days prior to the announcement. Next, we compute the target $CAR minus the acquirer 
                                                          
24 The results in Table 7 should be interpreted with caution because, as noted by Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004), restructuring 
activities that (i) change the overall capital intensity of a firm's businesses, (ii) eliminate businesses or product lines, or (iii) result 
in writing down the book values of certain assets, can trigger meaningful changes in operating performance. 
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$CAR. We then divide this difference by the sum of acquirer and target market values 50 trading days 
before the merger announcement to obtain our relative gain dependent variable. The key independent 
variables and all other control variables in the Table 8 regressions are similar to those in Table 7. 
Model (1) of Table 8 indicates that target firms get a relatively higher share of the gains when their 
CEOs get a merger bonus. In this circumstance, the presence of a bonus is associated with an increase of 
1.58% in the relative gain of the target vs. the acquirer per dollar of total market value. Thus, the effect of 
the bonus appears economically important given that in our sample the unconditional mean relative gain is 
4.9%. We note that the results related to industry dependence (proxied by Acquirer purchases / Total target 
sales) and target prior returns are consistent with the findings in Ahern (2012). The evidence in Table 8 
therefore is inconsistent with Prediction 3 of the wealth transfer hypothesis. Hence, rather than transferring 
wealth in the average transaction, it appears that the merger bonus revises the target CEO’s compensation 
contract to align manager-shareholder incentives in the target firm. 
Overall, our evidence on Predictions 1 through 3 is consistent with the contractual revision alternative 
that suggests that the dominant effect of merger bonuses is to align the interests of target CEOs and their 
shareholders.   
 
4.7. Propensity score matching 
If our instrument fails the exclusion restriction of being uncorrelated with the error term in the second-
stage equations, our IV estimates in Tables 4 - 8 can be biased. This could happen if nonlinear relations of 
our variables or omitted covariates bias our estimates. Moreover, our claim that the enforceability of non-
compete contracts meets the exclusion restriction might be vulnerable in the context of an acquisition. 
Specifically, Garmaise’s conclusions notwithstanding, one would expect that the amount a bidder is willing 
to pay for a target depends on the bidder’s ability to capture the value created in the acquisition.  If that 
value creation is partially embodied in a target CEO who may be able to leave the firm and compete against 
it, the potential synergies are surely affected. So, even if the net effect of non-compete enforceability on the 
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standalone firm value is not observably different from zero (Garmaise, 2011), the opposite can be true in a 
merger. Indeed, as we mentioned earlier, Garmaise’s explanation for the lack of a value effect relies on 
offsetting effects that arguably may become unbalanced in a merger setting.  
To address the potential issues related to our IV approach and further assess the robustness of our 
baseline results, we follow Gerakos, Lang, and Maffett (2013) and Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker 
(2010) and use a propensity score matching procedure. We employ propensity matching to estimate an 
average treatment effect (ATE) of merger bonuses to target CEOs on acquisition outcomes. 
The first step of our propensity score matching procedure uses a logit model to estimate the probability 
of being in the treated group (i.e., of awarding a merger bonus to the target CEO) as a function of observable 
characteristics. In the second step, we use the estimated ex ante probability of being in the treated group to 
form matched pairs of observations with similar estimated ex ante probability of being in the treated group 
but different ex post realizations of the treatment.  
The key feature of our propensity score procedure is that it analyzes target firms that are jointly similar 
in all the matching dimensions but different in terms of their bonus award decision. Therefore, our method 
estimates the counterfactual outcomes of target firms by using the outcomes from a subsample of matched 
target firms from the other group (treatment or control). Differences in performance measures between the 
two groups (such as target premiums or acquirer returns) measure the effect of the merger bonus. This 
measurement however relies on the crucial assumption that we have enough controls –pre-treatment 
covariates and outcomes– so that, conditional on those controls, treatment assignment is essentially 
randomized (Imbens and Rubin, 2013). 
In our matching procedure (reported in Panel A of Table 9), we use all the control variables and fixed 
effects we use in our baseline specification in model (1) of Table 3. Following Abadie and Imbens (2008), 
we obtain confidence intervals using a matching estimator that uses a Gaussian kernel with 500 bootstrap 
repetitions. Since we are matching jointly on multiple variables, treatment and control samples may not 
have the same size or similar characteristics in all matched dimensions. Nevertheless, our results do not 
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change if (a) we use different subsets of these matching characteristics, or (b) we use neighborhood 
matching instead of Gaussian kernel. 
The empirical results from our propensity matching score methodology show that deals in which the 
target CEO gets a merger bonus exhibit significantly lower target premiums, synergies, acquirer returns, 
and post-deal operating performance. Panel B of Table 9 reports the respective ATE for these 
variables, -5.26%, -2.11%, -1.94%, and -2.27%. Panel B also shows that targets with bonuses get a larger 
share of the gains relative to their acquirers (ATE of 1.27%). These effects generate inferences similar to 
those arising from our earlier analyses.  
We recognize that in our particular setting, the use of propensity score matching is not without potential 
issues. In this paper we argue that, in partially unobservable ways related to expected synergies, expected 
lost wages and the CEO’s utility function, merger bonuses are used to align target CEOs’ incentives with 
those of their shareholders. Because of this, matching deals on observable characteristics might not create 
an appropriately random separation between the treatment and control groups. Nonetheless, in addition to 
confirming the robustness of our baseline results, the results from both our IV and propensity score 
matching tests are consistent with the predictions of the contractual revision hypothesis about merger 
bonuses and would be hard to reconcile with alternative explanations. 
 
5. Additional tests 
This section describes further analyses to consider alternative explanations and probe the robustness of 
the preceding findings. 
 
5.1. Accounting irregularities and wealth transfer 
Some subset of deals might involve wealth transfers even if the dominant effect of the merger bonus is 
consistent with the contractual revision view. In this subsection, we identify such a subset by looking at 
target firms in which accounting systems are not working well.  
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Our logic for identifying this group as a subset where wealth transfer is most likely to occur is as 
follows. The wealth transfer hypothesis presumes large agency problems between target managers and their 
outside shareholders; therefore, where agency problems are more severe, wealth transfer is more likely. 
More severe agency problems are likely to occur where the control mechanisms that align incentives and 
monitor management break down.  Healy and Palepu (2001) note that financial reporting and disclosure 
provide some of these important control mechanisms. These mechanisms are weakened, however, when 
financial reporting is strategically manipulated (see, for example, Farber (2005) and Ege (2014)). Therefore, 
we examine here two potential indicators of the manipulation in the accounting system – abnormal accruals 
(identifying potential earnings management) and SEC enforcement actions – as indicators of severe agency 
problems and therefore a higher likelihood of wealth transfer. 
We believe that high accruals and enforcement actions provide a useful link to agency and governance 
concerns. Indeed, these are two of the most commonly used measures in the accounting literature to proxy 
for earnings manipulation (see Dechow et al (2010)). For example, Klein (2002) documents an inverse 
association between the size of accruals and several corporate governance attributes that are important in 
monitoring managers. With regards to SEC enforcement actions, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) note 
that, due to limited resources, the SEC pursues cases where it can demonstrate that management knew or 
should have known that the information contained in its financial statements was flawed. Thus, it is 
reasonable to assume that typical firms facing enforcement actions by the SEC knowingly and intentionally 
engaged in severe accounting violations, suggesting that large agency costs are likely. Consequently, given 
the large agency costs, subsets of target firms with SEC enforcement actions filed against them (or with 
consistently high abnormal accruals) should be more likely to have merger bonuses that generate wealth 
transfers to acquiring shareholders.  
We recognize that our identification of agency problems is not perfect. As explained in Dechow, Ge, 
and Schrand (2010), there are many potential reasons for large abnormal accruals and SEC enforcements, 
some of which have nothing to do with agency problems. These variables can indicate benign characteristics 
such as the innate volatility in the firm’s cash flows, the amount of resources the firm has invested in 
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maintaining good internal control systems (which vary with firm size and profitability), and the complexity 
of the firm’s operations. In fact, even if these variables proxy for earnings management, such activity is not 
always shareholder wealth reducing. For example, shareholders might benefit if earnings are managed to 
reduce the likelihood of technical covenant defaults or to avoid costly government regulatory actions.  
Furthermore, the precise mechanism by which accounting irregularities affect takeover incentives is 
never quite clear. On the one hand, these accounting irregularities could be evidence of target firms with 
high agency costs. On the other hand, targets with accounting irregularities may have inherently noisier 
accounting systems that do not provide precise signals about their managers’ performance, thereby allowing 
managers more opportunities to shirk and consume perks. Under either of these possibilities, however, high 
accruals are likely to be present in firms where it is difficult to monitor and control managers. 
Despite the limitations, the evidence in the extant literature suggests that these measures can be useful. 
Furthermore, using the two different indicators of accounting-related agency problems can be especially 
helpful in distinguishing signal from noise.  As DeFond (2010) points out in related research on earnings 
quality, “when … proxies are simply noisy measures of the same underlying theoretical construct, 
triangulation may rule out the possibility that the observed association is driven by the noise component of 
a given measure.” Therefore, in our context, it is unlikely that both SEC enforcements and high accruals 
will be associated with wealth transfers due to noise. 
We explicitly investigate the idea that wealth transfer may be more likely where agency problems are 
high by utilizing accounting irregularity indicator variables. Specifically, we use the modified Jones (1991) 
model proposed by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and implemented by Klein (2002) among others, 
to define an abnormal accrual (0,1) indicator. This variable is set to one if the value of a target’s 
discretionary accruals in each of the three fiscal years before the merger announcement is above its industry 
median. Otherwise the indicator is set to zero.25 We also define an SEC enforcement indicator which we 
set to one for firms charged by the SEC for alleged financial accounting violations committed during the 
                                                          
25 Using either the original Jones (1991) model or the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model instead of the Jones modification produces 
qualitatively similar results. Based on our definition, there are 192 instances of earnings management in the sample. 
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fiscal year before the merger announcement date.26 Firms are required to disclose formal SEC investigations 
for such violations to its shareholders. Note that our accruals measure proxies for potential self-dealing 
which is perhaps distinguishable by outsiders before merger completion. Conversely, the SEC enforcement 
action is a measure that typically comes to light only after the merger bid’s resolution.  
To ensure that accounting irregularities in our sample identify situations in which agency problems are 
likely to be high, we first estimate their correlations with several governance characteristics. The estimates 
are reported in Panel A of Table 10. We note that both our earnings management variable and our SEC 
enforcement indicator exhibit negative correlations with the independent board indicator and positive 
correlations with the CEO-Chairman dummy. These results are consistent with those in Klein (2002). In 
interpreting her results she argues “…that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO are more 
effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.” Likewise, Cornett, Marcus, and 
Tehranian (2008) argue that the dual leadership structure enables CEOs to effectively control information 
available to other board members and thus may deter effective monitoring, resulting in greater use of 
discretionary accruals. Consistent with our correlations, Beasley (1996), Dechow et al (1996), and Farber 
(2005) also find a lower incidence of SEC accounting enforcement actions for firms with more independent 
boards. Thus it appears that the evidence in Panel A of Table 10 validates the use of our accounting 
irregularity variables to indicate agency. We also estimate (but do not tabulate) correlations between our 
accounting irregularity indicators and variables that likely identify firms with high risk (e.g., Beta, standard 
deviation of stock returns, low credit rating, and an indicator for “junk” debt). Only half of the correlations 
are positive and none achieves statistical significance. This evidence casts doubt on the possibility that, in 
our case, the accounting irregularity indicators are proxying for risk. 
                                                          
26 The SEC issues enforcement actions against firms that it identifies as having violated the financial reporting requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Following Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2007), we track post-merger bid enforcement actions 
initiated by the SEC for pre-merger violations of any of three provisions of the 1934 Act, as amended by the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977: (i) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), which requires firms to keep and maintain books and records that accurately 
reflect all transactions; (ii) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(B), which requires firms to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls; and (iii) 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(5), which establishes that no person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to 
implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or account. In our sample, there are 46 
instances of SEC enforcement actions. 
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We use Table 10, Panels B through F, to test whether the inclusion of these measures for extreme 
agency problems affects the results we present in Tables 4 through 8.  In particular, we would like to see if 
our inferences about the role of bonuses would change and we would instead find wealth transfers occurring 
where the normal control system was failing.  We are particularly interested in the coefficients on 
interaction terms between these accounting irregularity dummy variables and our bonus variable.  
In Panel B of Table 10, we run two premium regressions which are specified similar to model (1) in 
Table 4. To conserve space and avoid repetition we only report the estimates for key variables in Panel B. 
The results indicate that premiums are lower for target firms with high abnormal accruals or SEC 
enforcement actions. More importantly, premiums are even lower (by 2% to 2.5%) when target CEOs get 
a merger bonus and their firms exhibit any of the two accounting irregularities we study.  Whether the 
negative association between bonuses and premiums is due to a wealth transfer to acquirers or low synergies 
necessitating contractual revision, there is a stronger effect in the subsample of firms with accounting 
abnormalities. 
In Panel C of Table 10 we report the key estimates of two acquisition synergy regressions in which we 
interact the Bonus (0,1) indicator with our two accounting irregularity variables, respectively. As with the 
results in Table 5, estimates for the Bonus (0,1) indicator in Panel C continue to be negative and statistically 
significant and associated with a synergy decline of 1.69% to 2.06%. Neither of the indicators for 
accounting irregularities attains significant coefficients, though the point estimates are negative for both in 
the presence of accounting abnormalities. However, the value of the interaction term of the bonus and the 
accounting irregularity indicator is positive and significant in both regressions. The interaction terms 
indicate that deals with targets that pay their CEOs a merger bonus and have accounting irregularities 
exhibit synergies that are 3.18% to 3.84% higher, inconsistent with contractual revision. This finding, in 
tandem with the lower premiums paid for these targets, suggests that acquirers in deals with merger bonuses 
capture a larger share of the surplus in the accounting irregularity subsamples. 
In Panels D through F of Table 10, we directly investigate the acquirer returns and the division of 
synergies in the accounting irregularity subsamples. For this purpose, we again use interaction terms of the 
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bonus with our accounting irregularity variables. Consistent with the estimates in Table 6, the coefficients 
for the Bonus (0,1) variable are negative and significant in Panel D. Conversely, estimates for the 
accounting irregularity indicators are negative but not significant. However, the interaction terms of the 
bonus and the accounting irregularity dummy are positive and statistically significant in both tests. The 
interaction results indicate that acquirer M&A announcement stock returns are about 4% higher in deals in 
which a bonus-paying target firm is associated with either high accruals or an SEC enforcement action.  In 
Panel E we study the post-merger operating performance for deals with bonus-getting target CEOs that lead 
firms implicated in accounting irregularities. The results in Panel E show that post-deal accounting 
performance is 1.14% to 1.73% higher in mergers involving targets with both an accounting irregularity 
and a target CEO merger bonus. Panel F provides evidence about the sharing of synergies in deals with 
target firms that are involved in accounting irregularities. The estimates show that these target firms exhibit 
a decrease of 1.34% to 1.82% in the relative gain vs. their acquirers per dollar of total market value. 
Collectively, the findings in Panels D through F of Table 10 lend support to the wealth transfer hypothesis 
in targets with accounting irregularities. This is consistent with the conjecture that severe agency problems 
in targets with accounting irregularities lead to the use of merger bonuses to transfer wealth to acquirers. 
Hence, while our contractual revision alternative appears to be the dominant and average effect of merger 
bonuses, it does not hold in all subsamples. 
 
5.2. Hard-to-sell targets 
For the average M&A deal we study, the lower takeover premiums received by targets that give their 
CEOs a merger bonus coupled with the lower average acquirer returns in these deals do not support the 
wealth transfer hypothesis. Instead, and consistent with the contracting revision alternative, in these 
transactions acquirers pay less for the targets but also get less in the form of low synergies. It is possible 
that, ceteris paribus, the lower synergy gains associated with these firms do not make them attractive 
takeover targets. In this scenario, which is also consistent with the contracting revision view, the merger 
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bonus could be provided to CEOs heading hard-to-sell targets. That is, the bonus is a reward given to CEOs 
able to negotiate and successfully accomplish the takeover of their hard-to-sell targets. 
We run two (untabulated) logit models to evaluate the hard-to-sell conjecture. Specifically, in one 
model we estimate the probability that the deal involves multiple bidders (two or more) using a specification 
similar to that in Officer (2003). In the other, we estimate the probability that the deal is initiated by the 
target firm with a logit regression similar to that in Aktas, de Bodt, and Roll (2010). The main independent 
variable in both of these tests is a bonus indicator that is set to one if the target awards a merger bonus to 
its CEO (and set to zero otherwise). The estimate for the bonus indicator in the first test (-0.7033, p-value 
= 0.0285) implies that deals with this benefit are 5.89 percentage points less likely to involve multiple 
bidders. In our second test, the bonus (0,1) coefficient (0.4415, p-value = 0.0278) indicates that targets are 
10.18 percentage points more likely to initiate their own sale when their CEO receives a merger bonus. This 
last result is noteworthy because, as noted by Aktas et al., targets that initiate their own sale earn low 
premiums. In general, the results of our multiple bidders and target initiation tests suggest that targets that 
give their CEOs a merger bonus appear to be hard-to-sell-targets.  
The results here lend credence to the contractual revision view in that they suggest that the target 
managers are not too eager to sell their companies for selfish reasons.  That is, for the average transaction 
there are typically no better offers that target managers are preempting for the personal gain of a bonus.  
When targets are hard-to-sell, any offer at a price above the stand-alone price is likely to benefit target 
shareholders.27 The evidence that these targets are hard-to-sell, therefore, makes it more likely that the 
contractual revision of the bonus has helped generate gains to all parties.28 
 
                                                          
27 Using a bonus rather than modifying an existing golden parachute (or enacting a new parachute) is probably easier for target 
firms looking to revise existing compensation exit packages for their CEOs given that the usual parachute rarely exceeds three 
times the CEO’s annual cash salary.  
28 The fact that merger bonuses encourage CEOs to accept low-synergy deals suggests that these payments may contribute to 
suboptimal resource allocation in the economy. In the extreme, a merger bonus may lead a target to accept a lower synergy deal 
even when a somewhat higher synergy deal exists. Nonetheless, the results on the lack of competition for bonus-paying targets 
appear to rule out this possibility. 
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5.3. Target CEO bargaining power hypothesis 
Many of our results are consistent with a setting in which more powerful target CEOs negotiate a larger 
share of the synergies for their shareholders, as well as a bonus for themselves. In Table 3, we observe that 
bonuses are higher when the CEO is also chairman, and is more entrenched, but are lower in a tender offer 
(going around the target CEO and the board). In Table 8, we note that bonuses correlate with more of the 
surplus going to the target. Collectively, this evidence suggests that the bonus might identify the target 
CEO’s personal bargaining power or deal-blocking ability.  
Given this discussion, it is hard to distinguish the bargaining power hypothesis from the contractual 
revision view, and it is not clear how distinct they really are. CEO bargaining power is necessary to force 
recontracting (if the CEO has no power, there is no need to incentivize her with a bonus to do the deal). 
However, the inferences are subtly different because the contractual revision view conjectures that the 
bonus is needed to induce the target CEO to undertake a deal that benefits her shareholders. In contrast, the 
conjecture under the CEO bargaining hypothesis is that in the process of bargaining for a good deal for her 
shareholders, the target CEO also bargains for a bonus for herself. Our problem in discriminating between 
the two hypotheses, as more generally noted by Prendergast (2002), is that we do not observe the roles, 
intentions, and responsibilities behind the corporate decision-making process, including how these vary 
across different decisions and settings. Therefore, we acknowledge that our evidence is also consistent with 
the target CEO bargaining power hypothesis. 
 
5.4. Bad acquirer hypothesis 
Another possibility that might rationalize our results is a “bad acquirer” hypothesis. Under this 
hypothesis, the acquirer is badly managed and/or has agency problems so it makes a bad bid, requests a 
bonus for the target CEO to make sure that the deal goes through, and mismanages the assets going forward. 
Of course, this is only a problem for target shareholders if there is an alternative acquirer that would submit 
a higher bid for their firm. Therefore, our evidence on the lack of multiple bidders undermines the 
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possibility that this is a problem.  But the evidence we have compiled so far does not completely rule out 
the bad acquirer alternative, which is a reasonable explanation for why some acquirers are doing these deals. 
We investigate this alternative hypothesis next.   
To consider the bad acquirer alternative, we re-estimate our probability of multiple bidders regression 
by including (as a control variable) an interaction term between the bonus and a proxy for the acquirer’s 
governance (and potential agency problems). Our first governance proxy is the acquirer’s Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) governance index (G-index). Neither the interaction term nor the standalone G-index 
variable attains statistical significance. In contrast, the coefficient for the bonus indicator is still negative 
and significant. We estimate the same regression two more times by respectively replacing the G-index 
with variables that, as noted by Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010), proxy for the firm’s financial reporting 
informativeness: a (0,1) indicator to track independent boards and a different (0,1) indicator for independent 
audit committees. None of the interaction terms using these indicators attains statistical significance. 
Results are similar when we replace the G-index with the board’s equity holdings (as a % of the acquirer’s 
common equity). 
We also repeat (but do not tabulate) our main tests with the acquirer’s G-index, the board’s equity 
holdings, and the two indicator variables just described as additional control variables. After controlling for 
these, the results are qualitatively similar. In the presence of merger bonuses, premiums are 4.9% lower, 
synergies are 1.4% smaller, acquirer returns are 1.5% lower, post deal ROA is 1.6% smaller, and target 
relative gains are 1.5% higher. 
A different way to identify “bad” acquirers is by tracking post-acquisition write-offs of goodwill. Li, 
Shroff, Venkataraman, and Zhang (2011) find that overpayment for takeover targets predicts the 
impairment of goodwill. Relatedly, Gu and Lev (2011) maintain that a dysfunctional acquisition strategy is 
often highlighted by post-merger goodwill write-offs. An important takeaway from these studies is that 
write-offs might be a symptom of empire-building acquirer CEOs and/or acquirer firms with agency 
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problems. Therefore, we study whether the payment of a merger bonus to the target CEO affects the 
likelihood of a post-acquisition goodwill write-off. 
In untabulated tests, we run logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is set to one if the 
acquirer reports an impairment of goodwill related to the merger in year 1 or year 2 immediately after deal 
completion. Otherwise, the dependent variable is set to zero. This procedure follows that employed in both 
Gu and Lev (2011) and Li et al. (2011) and, in our tests, some of the control variables produce results that 
conform to their work. For instance, consistent with the predictions in Gu and Lev (2011), we find that 
acquirer overvaluation (proxied by the market to book ratio in our tests) is positively related to  the 
likelihood of a write-off. Our results indicate that merger bonuses are not generally related to the write-off 
of goodwill after acquisitions. These findings do not support for the bad acquirer alternative. 
Importantly, our goodwill analyses show that write-offs are less likely in deals with target CEO bonuses 
in which the target firms are implicated in accounting irregularities. Transactions involving these targets 
are nearly 7 percentage points less likely to exhibit a goodwill write-off. This result appears economically 
important given that, in our data, write-offs occur in 21 percent of completed deals involving public bidders. 
Consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, this finding suggests that deals  with merger bonuses 
performed by agency afflicted targets are particularly accretive for the acquirers. 
 
5.5. Bonus objectives 
As can be seen in Panel B of Table 2, much of the sample comprises bonus payments that are designed 
to somehow keep the CEO from working for the competition (non-compete, consult or retention). This 
suggests that often, the bonuses are directly paying the CEO for lost wages and flexibility. At the same 
time, it is likely that in situations where the synergies are small, it is even more important to secure them 
from any potential reduction by preventing the target CEO from competing against the merged firm. Yet, 
we note that in many instances the bonus payment does not prevent the target CEO from competing.  
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Given the above discussion, the documented differences in the stated goal of the bonus payment raise 
the issue of whether our results vary according to the bonuses’ stated purpose. To address this issue, in 
Panel A of Table 11, we split our sample according to whether the bonus prevents competition by the target 
CEO. To do so, we consider the 151 cases in which the bonus is tied to a non-compete clause, a consulting 
agreement, or a job for (retention of) the target CEO. We contrast these observations with the 68 cases in 
which the merger bonus does not prevent ex-post competition by the CEO. To do so, we evaluate mean and 
median premiums, acquirer returns and synergies. The evidence indicates that the results differ according 
to the bonus objective. In situations where the bonus prevents competition, premiums are higher while both 
synergies and the merger announcement returns to the bidder are significantly lower.29 Consistent with the 
contractual revision hypothesis, the synergies result supports the idea that if synergy is lower it might be 
more important to prevent competition from the target CEO.  
 
5.6. Strength of the merger-related incentives 
As noted by Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004, p. 38): “By selling the firm, target CEOs may be 
giving up substantial expected utility from both future wages (if they are not retained) and the lost ability 
to extract personal benefits from the firm.” In addition, as noted by Moeller (2005, p. 172) “… a CEO with 
a long tenure at the firm could have built up more firm-specific human capital that she could lose in a 
takeover.” All of these issues lead the target managers to consider a tradeoff in dealing with a takeover bid 
– a positive gain from the takeover premium for the shares or options they own compared with the losses 
in human capital they will suffer upon the sale of their firm. 
                                                          
29 Note that the association of non-compete agreements with differences in premiums, synergies, and acquirer returns does not 
imply that the exclusion condition for the Garmaise index is violated in our IV estimation.  The exclusion restriction is about the 
non-compete agreement enforceability index, not the agreement itself.  In results not tabulated, we find that for bonus-giving targets 
with non-compete agreements, firms in states with high Garmaise indexes have approximately the same average premiums, 
synergy, and acquirer returns, as firms in low Garmaise index states.  Similarly there are no significant differences across the 
Garmaise index in these three key variables for bonus-giving targets without non-compete agreements.  Thus, while having an 
agreement matters to returns, it matters the same in a high Garmaise index state as in a low Garmaise index state.  This similarity 
in effect is analogous to what we require for our IV exclusion restriction to hold. 
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The above discussion suggests that our results may vary according to the pre-bonus strength of the 
target CEOs’ merger-related incentives. We evaluate this possibility in Panel B of Table 11 by splitting the 
sample of target CEOs that receive a merger bonus in two groups. The first includes 72 target CEOs with 
large incentives to complete a deal in the absence of a bonus, because: (1) the golden parachute value is in 
the top quartile of all CEOs in the sample, or (2) the value of the CEO’s existing stock and option holdings 
is in the top quartile of all CEOs in the sample, or (3) the CEO negotiates an increase in the value of an 
existing golden parachute, or (4) the CEO gets unscheduled option grants during merger negotiations. The 
second group includes all other bonus-getting target CEOs. The results show that CEOs in the first group 
are associated with lower premiums and both higher synergies and acquirer returns. These findings suggest 
that bonuses to the highly incentivized group of 72 CEOs are candidates for generating wealth transfers to 
acquirer shareholders. Nevertheless, the results from the latter group of 147 target CEOs in which both 
synergies and acquirer returns are lower, as well as the results reported in Tables 4 through 8, reinforce the 
view that the dominant effect of merger bonuses is consistent with the contractual revision hypothesis.30  
 
5.7. Acquisition premium and acquirer return alternatives 
The tests presented in Table 4 use the four-week premium reported by SDC as the dependent variable. 
We re-estimate the Table 4 regressions using three different premium measures. The alternative premium 
proxies are (1) the target’s CAR during the window (-20, +1) relative to the announcement date as in Jarrell 
and Poulsen (1989), (2) the target’s CAR during the window (-42, +126) following Schwert (1996), and (3) 
the “combined” merger premium defined in Officer (2003) as the dependent variable.31  
                                                          
30 The evidence showing negative acquirer returns in each bonus subgroup may be taken as some support for the “bad bidder” 
hypothesis discussed earlier.  But as Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011) show, this may be due to our sample selection 
procedures.  In any case, the bidders with bonuses are no worse than the bidders without bonuses in our sample. 
31 Specifically, following Officer (2003), we first estimate a premium based on component data using the aggregate value of cash, 
stock, and other securities offered by the bidder to target shareholders as reported by SDC. We then estimate premiums based on 
initial price and final price data, respectively. These prices are also reported by SDC. All premium measures are then deflated by 
the target’s market value 42 trading days prior to the bid announcement. The combined premium is based on the component measure 
if it is greater than zero and less than two. Otherwise, the premium relies on the initial price measure (or on the final price measure 
if initial price data are missing). 
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The results from the ancillary tests, which appear in Panel C of Table 11, also document an inverse 
association between the use of a merger bonus and the takeover premium. According to the estimates, 
premiums are 3.85 to 5.28 percentage points lower when these benefits are part of the merger pay package 
given to target CEOs. Premiums are even lower (by 1.56% to 3.89%) in deals in which a target firm that 
pays a merger bonus to its CEO is associated with either pre-takeover abnormal accruals or an SEC 
enforcement action. The use of the alternative premiums, in general, does not change any of our previous 
inferences.  
In Panel D of Table 11 we also estimate alternative acquirer return regressions similar to those reported 
in Table 6. In those tests, we follow the procedure in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and replace the 
acquirer’s return with the CAR accruing to the bidder on deal announcement during the (-2, +2) and (-5, 
+5) windows. In both tests, the coefficients for the merger bonus are still negative and significantly related 
to the acquirer’s return. For instance, the estimate for the merger bonus indicator in the regression that 
measures acquirer returns during the (-2, +2) window is -0.0173, p-value = 0.0365. Nonetheless, the 
interaction term of the bonus and an accounting irregularity shows that, in these circumstances, acquirer 
returns are 3.27% to 3.35% higher. This last result is consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis of 
merger bonuses in deals involving the subgroup of targets with breakdowns of accounting controls.  
 
5.8. Examining different subsamples  
Earlier we note that 29 CEOs in our sample have a merger bonus provision in their compensation 
contracts once they are hired. Upon closer examination of these 29 cases, we note that in all instances the 
bonus amount is never disclosed. Instead, these provisions state that the bonus payment is to be “determined 
at a later time.” Nevertheless, we are concerned that for these 29 CEOs the bonus does not necessarily 
provide a contractual adjustment. As a result, we rerun our tests excluding these 29 cases. All of our results 
continue to hold after omitting these observations. For example, deals in which the target CEO receives a 
merger bonus exhibit 3.67% lower premiums (p-value = 0.0489), 1.53% lower synergies (p-value = 
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0.0374), 1.79% lower acquirer returns (p-value = 0.0376), and 1.79% lower post-merger operating 
performance (p-value = 0.0232). In the same transactions, targets get a larger share of the gains relative to 
their acquirers (1.73%, p-value = 0.0253). These findings are consistent with those reported earlier. 
We also are concerned that the subsample that includes all publicly traded bidders (the 497 cases which 
we use in Tables 5 and 6) is somewhat different from the overall sample. To address this concern and further 
evaluate the robustness of our results, we use this subsample to re-estimate the bonus determinants and the 
takeover premium regressions. The inferences arising from the new results match those from the tabulated 
results. For instance, the probability of getting a bonus increases by 9.6% for CEOs who also chair their 
boards and by 3% for a one point increase in the E-index. The probability declines by 2% for target CEOs 
for a one standard deviation increase in the value of their golden parachute and by 2.1% for a one point 
decrease in the non-compete index. In this subsample of public bidders we find that the presence of a bonus 
is associated with a decline in the takeover premium of 4.94% (p-value = 0.0420). This ancillary evidence 
indicates that the samples analyzed in Tables 5 and 6 are not unusual. 
In Section 3.1. herein, it is noted that we discard 207 observations for which deal background and target 
CEO exit compensation information is not available from either the merger proxy filed by the target and/or 
acquirer with the SEC or from news event searches in Lexis/Nexis. Under disclosure regulation, it is likely 
that the lack of exit pay information in these 207 cases indicates that bonuses, parachutes, stock options, 
etc. were never awarded to the target CEOs. Alternatively, it is possible that some of these cases are the 
really egregious ones in which undeserved exit payments and other benefits are concealed. While we cannot 
tell whether such lack of disclosure is benign (there were no exit payments to disclose), we can investigate 
the impact of the discarded cases in our analyses. Assuming that merger bonuses are not really paid in the 
aforementioned 207 M&A deals, we re-estimate our main analyses by including these deals. The coefficient 
for the bonus (0,1) indicator in the premium, synergy, acquirer return, accounting return, and division of 
gains regressions is -0.0419 (p-value = 0.0359), -0.0189 (p-value = 0.0177), -0.0196 (p-value = 0.0138), -
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0.0138 (p-value = 0.0461), and 0.0174 (p-value = 0.0243), respectively. The estimates from these 
robustness tests yield inferences that are consistent with those from our tabulated baseline results. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We examine whether merger bonuses to target CEOs enable a wealth transfer from target to acquirer 
shareholders. We advance an alternative hypothesis that these bonuses are used to implement a contractual 
revision in compensation to circumvent conflicts of interest that arise between target CEOs and target 
shareholders – particularly in takeover deals that generate small synergies. We develop and test predictions 
from both hypotheses.   
Our empirical evidence indicates that for the average takeover that includes a merger bonus, deals do 
not exhibit a transfer of wealth from shareholders of the target to shareholders of the acquirer. These 
findings support the contractual revision hypothesis. In this regard, our evidence indicates that in low 
synergy targets, merger bonuses serve an important economic role by providing a necessary adjustment in 
the takeover-related compensation received by target CEOs that aligns their incentives with those of their 
shareholders.  
Despite these results about averages and the dominant effects of bonuses, we cannot reject the wealth 
transfer hypothesis for every individual deal. When we isolate situations likely to involve severe agency 
problems, we find that wealth transfers seem to occur in deals of bonus-paying target firms with accounting 
abnormalities. Specifically, wealth appears to be transferred from target to acquirer shareholders when a 
bonus-paying target firm has persistently high abnormal accruals or is subject to an SEC enforcement 
action. Overall then, according to our analyses, both hypotheses are supported in subgroups of the data, but 
the contractual revision view appears to be the dominant motivation for awarding target CEOs a merger 
bonus.  
In general, our analyses show that firm- and transaction-specific circumstances could justify additional 
managerial benefits in somewhat counterintuitive situations (in our case, low synergy takeovers). In fact, 
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our evidence suggests that merger bonuses can benefit target shareholders especially when their companies 
generate low synergies with potential bidders. In this regard, our results indicate that larger executive 
compensation packages and even side payments –particularly when payoffs to shareholders are low– do 
not necessarily represent nefarious managerial behavior and may have productive consequences in 
encouraging useful deals. At the same time, our findings also show that managers in takeover targets with 
breakdowns in their accounting systems may compromise the interests of their own shareholders. 
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Table 1: Sample description 
 
This table describes our sample which consists of 949 merger and acquisition (M&A) bids announced during 1999-2009 and tracked 
in the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) M&A database. We require that target firms have stock market, accounting, governance, 
and deal background data available from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Compustat, RiskMetrics, and proxy 
filings/Lexis Nexis search, respectively. In Panel A we report the Fama and French (1997) 48 industrial and temporal distribution 
of the sample targets. In Panel B we report deal status, mode of acquisition, method of payment, attitude, deal value, and deal 
performance. Deal characteristics are obtained from SDC. Information on the sale procedure and the deal initiator is obtained from 
the merger background section in the proxies filed by parties to the merger with the SEC. Financial variables are measured at the 
fiscal year end before the merger announcement date. All variables are defined in the Appendix.  
 
Panel A: Industrial and temporal distribution for targets 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Pct.
Agriculture 1 – – 1 – – – 1 1 – – 4 0.42
Food Products – 9 3 – – 1 – – – 2 – 15 1.58
Candy Soda – – – – – – – – – – 2 2 0.21
Beer Liquor – – – – – – – – – 1 – 1 0.11
Tobacco Products – 1 – – – – – – – 1 – 2 0.21
Recreation – – – – – – – – 2 – – 2 0.21
Entertainment 3 4 1 – – 6 – 6 – – – 20 2.11
Printing Publishing – 3 – – – – 1 4 2 – – 10 1.05
Consumer Goods 3 – 2 1 1 – 3 2 – – 2 14 1.48
Apparel 1 1 – – 1 – 2 – 3 1 – 9 0.95
Healthcare 1 1 – – – 1 5 – 4 1 – 13 1.37
Medical Equipment 3 6 3 1 – 3 3 3 4 4 1 31 3.27
Pharmaceuticals 10 6 2 1 3 3 4 4 8 5 4 50 5.27
Chemicals 5 1 – 1 – 2 1 3 1 2 – 16 1.69
Rubber Plastic  4 1 – – – – – 1 1 – – 7 0.74
Textiles – 2 1 – – 1 – 1 – – – 5 0.53
Construction Materials 5 6 – – 2 2 – 4 1 – – 20 2.11
Construction – 2 2 – – – – – – – 1 5 0.53
Steel Work 4 1 – – – 2 1 6 4 – – 18 1.90
Fabricated Products 2 – – – – – – – – – – 2 0.21
Machinery 4 4 2 1 – 3 4 1 2 1 1 23 2.42
Electrical Equipment 2 3 – – – – 2 1 1 – – 9 0.95
Automobiles Trucks 2 4 – 1 – – – 2 – – – 9 0.95
Aircraft 2 1 – – – – – – 1 – – 4 0.42
Shipbuilding Railroad 6 1 2 – – – – – – – – 9 0.95
Defense – – – – – 1 – – – – – 1 0.11
Precious Metals – 1 1 – – – – – – – – 2 0.21
Non–metallic Mining 2 – – 1 – – – – – – – 3 0.32
Petroleum Natural Gas 3 7 9 2 2 6 5 6 1 1 – 42 4.43
Utilities 26 7 3 – 2 2 2 9 2 4 – 57 6.01
Communication 13 3 2 1 – 3 2 5 3 – – 32 3.37
Personal Services 1 – – 1 2 – – 1 2 1 – 8 0.84
Business Services 15 14 8 5 10 12 20 20 25 7 5 141 14.86
Computer Hardware 7 4 2 1 2 – 8 6 3 4 4 41 4.32
Computer Software 6 5 3 2 1 5 4 5 9 3 – 43 4.53
Measuring Equipment 1 – 1 – – 1 – – 4 2 1 10 1.05
Business Supplies 2 7 1 – 1 1 1 – 2 – – 15 1.58
Shipping Containers – – – – – – – – 1 – – 1 0.11
Transportation 5 4 4 – 1 – 1 2 4 – 1 22 2.32
Wholesale 5 3 4 2 1 3 3 3 2 2 – 28 2.95
Retail 6 3 1 1 5 1 13 7 9 5 – 51 5.37
Restaurants, Hotels 2 2 2 2 – 2 1 2 3 2 – 18 1.90
Banking 7 13 7 1 5 11 7 7 8 4 2 72 7.59
Insurance 9 3 2 1 4 2 2 1 4 5 – 33 3.48
Real Estate – – – – – – – 1 – – – 1 0.11
Trading – 4 1 1 2 1 4 3 6 2 1 25 2.63
Others 1 – – – 1 – – – 1 – – 3 0.32
Total 169 137 69 28 46 75 99 117 124 60 25 949 100
 Pct. 17.81 14.44 7.27 2.95 4.85 7.90 10.43 12.33 13.07 6.32 2.63 100   
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Panel B: Deal and target characteristics    
 
Proportion of sample Mean Median 
Deal characteristics    
Completion 0.8156   
Tender offer 0.1781   
Stock only  0.1359   
Cash only  0.5385   
Friendly attitude 0.8936   
Target initiated 0.3635   
Same industry 0.5437   
Deal value (US$ billion)  4.6107 1.5463 
Premium  0.3473 0.3130 
Synergy   0.0103 0.0053 
Acquirer return  -0.0317 -0.0235 
Post-deal operating performance  (ROA)  0.0642 0.0395 
Division of merger gains  0.0488 0.0381 
Target characteristics    
Market value of equity (US$ billion)  3.2506 0.9913 
M/B  2.7917 1.9761 
Leverage  0.2583 0.2503 
Prior year market adjusted stock return  -0.0183 -0.0524 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of merger bonus 
 
Panel A provides a breakdown of our sample deals based on whether the target CEO receives a merger bonus. Panel B shows the 
number of cases under different terms used by the target board to indicate a merger bonus. We obtain this information by reading 
the merger proxies, the last annual proxies and other forms before the merger announcement filed by either the target or the acquirer 
with the SEC (for example, S-4, DEFM 14, SC 14D9, SC TO, DEF 14, 8-K). In Panel C, we report the summary statistics of the 
merger bonus value for 219 cases in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus, and the same value scaled by the target 
CEO’s total compensation during the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement. 
 
Panel A: Target level information 
  
Full sample 949 
Targets in which the target CEO is awarded a merger bonus 219 
Target CEOs that have a merger bonus clause when they are first hired 29 
 
Panel B: Terms used by the target board to indicate a merger bonus 
  
Bonus 20 
Consulting bonus 59 
Management bonus 1 
Merger bonus 17 
Noncompetition bonus 41 
Retention bonus 58 
Separation bonus 2 
Signing bonus 6 
Special bonus 8 
Special recognition bonus 1 
Stay bonus 3 
Termination bonus 6 
Transaction bonus 11 
Transition bonus 2 
 
Panel C: Merger bonus value 
 Mean Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
Bonus value (US$ million) 1.5900 0.0225 0.4000 1.0000 2.0000 12.0000 
Bonus value / Total compensation  0.9114 0.0065 0.1612 0.4343 0.9614 24.5389 
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Table 3: Determinants of merger bonus 
 
The sample consists of 949 M&A bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1. The dependent variable in model (1) 
equals one if the target CEO receive a merger bonus and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in model (2) is the natural logarithm 
of the merger bonus value. The dependent variable in model (3) is the merger bonus value scaled by the target CEO’s total 
compensation during the year prior to the merger announcement. The dependent variable in models (2) and (3) equals zero if the 
bonus is not offered. All variables are defined in the Appendix. The reported p-values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
consistent. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
Dependent variable = Bonus (0,1)  Bonus value  Scaled bonus 
 Model (1)  Model (2)  Model (3) 
 coeff p-value  coeff p-value  coeff p-value 
Target characteristics        
Non-compete index 0.1376** 0.0310 0.1464** 0.0398  0.0101** 0.0376 
Size -0.2786*** 0.0006 -0.2241*** 0.0097  -0.0451*** 0.0001 
M/B -0.0025 0.8123 -0.0066 0.5297  -0.0007 0.5258 
Leverage -0.5408 0.4546 -0.4147 0.5811  0.0520 0.5090 
Operating cash flow 0.7786 0.1863 0.8663 0.1979  0.0361 0.6085 
Liquidity  0.6044 0.3261 0.7277 0.2964  0.0312 0.6689 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0441 0.8257 0.1690 0.4527  0.0663 0.4510 
Earnings management (0,1) -0.3836 0.1090 -0.4029 0.1123  -0.0348 0.1899 
Target CEO characteristics        
CEO-chairman (0,1)  0.5128** 0.0103 0.5384** 0.0127  0.0510** 0.0243 
CEO-founder (0,1)   -0.3580 0.2326 -0.3662 0.2567  -0.0071 0.8338 
CEO near retirement age (0,1) -0.1303 0.6008 -0.1528 0.5689  0.0048 0.8635 
CEO stock and option ownership  0.4003 0.5627 0.3537 0.6715  0.0506 0.5624 
Golden parachute  -0.0756** 0.0467 -0.0675* 0.0799  -0.0115*** 0.0093 
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  0.4957 0.1622 0.5060 0.2269  0.0171 0.6969 
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) 0.2010 0.3978 0.1484 0.5688  0.0179 0.5108 
Post-deal employment (0,1)  0.1818 0.3289 0.2906 0.1553  0.0476 0.1266 
Target governance characteristics        
Entrenchment index  0.2037*** 0.0093 0.2152** 0.0102  0.0237*** 0.0070 
Board size 0.0691* 0.0962 0.0725 0.1118  0.0071 0.1369 
Board ownership  -1.1323 0.3050 -0.5394 0.4713  -0.0636 0.4175 
Independent board (0,1) 0.2758 0.3307 0.2829 0.3474  0.0286 0.3652 
Handpicked compensation committee (0,1) 0.3850* 0.0522 0.4114* 0.0544  0.0073** 0.0433 
Institutional ownership  0.5820 0.3221 0.4375 0.4961  -0.0883 0.1900 
Deal characteristics        
Private acquirer (0,1) -0.2477 0.3700 -0.3205 0.2750  -0.0305 0.3217 
Toehold -0.0272 0.2429 -0.0165 0.3695  -0.0001 0.9463 
Cash payment (0,1)  -0.5239** 0.0150 -0.5904** 0.0140  -0.0545** 0.0306 
Tender offer (0,1) -1.0535*** 0.0005 -0.9131*** 0.0016  -0.0748** 0.0133 
Hostile (0,1) 0.6051 0.2743 0.4900 0.3647  0.0283 0.6174 
Competed deal (0,1) -0.3953 0.1848 -0.3396 0.2452  -0.0325 0.2881 
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.3166 0.1593 0.2554 0.2825  0.0151 0.5443 
Lockup (0,1) 1.1954* 0.0502 1.5766** 0.0375  0.0254 0.7489 
Same industry (0,1) -0.2546 0.2310 -0.2670 0.2414  -0.0425* 0.0752 
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.6833 0.2321 -0.6833 0.2464  0.0032 0.9585 
Target initiated deal (0,1) 0.1370 0.4629 0.1782 0.3913  0.0005 0.9829 
Acquirer input / Total target output -6.4257 0.2177 -3.9030 0.4933  0.4497 0.4514 
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales -0.0457 0.9916 0.1436 0.9763  -0.1939 0.7014 
Target industry M&A liquidity index -0.9161* 0.0688 -1.0388* 0.0507  -0.0372 0.5045 
One year macroeconomic change 0.0195 0.7277 0.0343 0.5578  0.0060 0.3270 
Constant -10.3028 0.9649 0.8944 0.6379  0.2601 0.1918 
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes  
N 949   949   949  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001   0.0012   0.0078  
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Table 4: Merger bonus and acquisition premiums 
 
The sample consists of 949 M&A bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1. We run acquisition premium regressions 
similar to those in Bargeron, Schlingemann, Stulz, and Zutter (2010). All variables are defined in the Appendix. The reported p-
values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = Four week SDC acquisition premium 
 Model (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS  Model (4) IV
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value  coeff p-value
Bonus (0,1) -0.0431** 0.0152        
Bonus value   -0.0058** 0.0236      
Scaled bonus     -0.0309** 0.0207    
Fitted bonus         -0.0433*** 0.0021
Target characteristics          
Non-compete index 0.0035 0.5103 0.0034 0.5217 0.0029 0.5896    
Size -0.0128** 0.0496 -0.0124* 0.0579 -0.0125* 0.0592  -0.0269*** 0.0001
M/B 0.0002 0.7631 0.0002 0.7776 0.0002 0.7618  0.0004 0.5832
Leverage 0.1274** 0.0241 0.1285** 0.0229 0.1325** 0.0193  0.1473*** 0.0063
Operating cash flow 0.0979* 0.0526 0.0976* 0.0535 0.0937* 0.0642  0.0849** 0.0149
Liquidity  0.1149** 0.0282 0.1148** 0.0284 0.1115** 0.0335  0.1179** 0.0114
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0571*** 0.0008 -0.0565*** 0.0009 -0.0554*** 0.0012  -0.0737*** 0.0001
Earnings management (0,1) -0.0473** 0.0132 -0.0474** 0.0129 -0.0462** 0.0157  -0.0522*** 0.0056
Target CEO characteristics          
CEO-chairman (0,1)  0.0053 0.7435 0.0050 0.7588 0.0034 0.8329  0.0344** 0.0407
CEO-founder (0,1)   -0.0025 0.9184 -0.0021 0.9320 -0.0002 0.9949  -0.0095 0.7000
CEO near retirement age (0,1) -0.0347* 0.0848 -0.0349* 0.0830 -0.0339* 0.0932  -0.0401** 0.0500
CEO stock and option ownership  -0.0448 0.4742 -0.0445 0.4767 -0.0450 0.4728  -0.0359 0.5766
Golden parachute  -0.0036 0.2528 -0.0035 0.2683 -0.0035 0.2754  -0.0056* 0.0912
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  -0.0051 0.8715 -0.0058 0.8542 -0.0082 0.7946  -0.0110 0.7355
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) -0.0419** 0.0321 -0.0419** 0.0322 -0.0422** 0.0313  -0.0358* 0.0751
Post-deal employment (0,1)  0.0230 0.1343 0.0233 0.1297 0.0231 0.1348  0.0237 0.1339
Target governance characteristics          
Entrenchment index  -0.0035 0.5769 -0.0036 0.5727 -0.0041 0.5190  -0.0076 0.2401
Board size -0.0009 0.7994 -0.0009 0.7961 -0.0011 0.7513  0.0018 0.5931
Board ownership  -0.0096 0.8648 -0.0088 0.8755 -0.0076 0.8921  0.0561 0.3114
Independent board (0,1) -0.0063 0.7792 -0.0065 0.7744 -0.0072 0.7491  -0.0185 0.4134
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  -0.0029 0.8563 -0.0027 0.8652 -0.0053 0.7392  -0.0006 0.9717
Institutional ownership  -0.0715 0.1386 -0.0730 0.1305 -0.0783 0.1059  -0.0511 0.2881
Deal characteristics          
Private acquirer (0,1) -0.0532** 0.0159 -0.0536** 0.0153 -0.0526** 0.0173  -0.0904*** 0.0001
Toehold -0.0009 0.5121 -0.0009 0.5148 -0.0008 0.5594  0.0005 0.7060
Cash payment (0,1)  0.0431** 0.0171 0.0433** 0.0167 0.0451** 0.0129  0.0142 0.4269
Tender offer (0,1) 0.0737*** 0.0007 0.0740*** 0.0007 0.0770*** 0.0004  0.0820*** 0.0001
Hostile (0,1) 0.0365 0.3684 0.0365 0.3681 0.0346 0.3954  0.0335 0.3727
Competed deal (0,1) 0.0154 0.4827 0.0154 0.4833 0.0164 0.4570  0.0027 0.9040
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.0525*** 0.0033 0.0521*** 0.0035 0.0511*** 0.0043  0.0673*** 0.0002
Lockup (0,1) -0.0799 0.1606 -0.0797 0.1617 -0.0881 0.1219  0.0100 0.8654
Same industry (0,1) -0.0026 0.8810 -0.0029 0.8637 -0.0027 0.8750  -0.0133 0.4223
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.1565*** 0.0004 -0.1557*** 0.0005 -0.1517*** 0.0006  -0.1888*** 0.0001
Target initiated deal (0,1) -0.0315** 0.0433 -0.0317** 0.0425 -0.0327** 0.0366  -0.0307* 0.0532
Acquirer input / Total target output -0.2376 0.5785 -0.2210 0.6053 -0.1844 0.6670  -0.1585 0.6232
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales -0.2348 0.5166 -0.2331 0.5198 -0.2399 0.5085  -0.0485 0.8642
Target industry M&A liquidity index 0.0108 0.7870 0.0107 0.7879 0.0156 0.6954  -0.0094 0.6946
One year macroeconomic change -0.0077* 0.0782 -0.0077* 0.0801 -0.0077* 0.0803  -0.0057** 0.0128
Constant 0.5043*** 0.0004 0.4980*** 0.0005 0.5009*** 0.0005  0.6155*** 0.0001
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
N 949  949  949   949  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001   0.0001  
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Table 5: Merger bonus and acquisition synergies 
 
From the original 949 M&A bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1, we examine 497 offers made by U.S. public 
bidders with available data from CRSP, Compustat and RiskMetrics. We run acquisition synergy regressions similar to those in 
Wang and Xie (2009). All variables are defined in the Appendix. The reported p-values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity 
consistent. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = Acquisition synergy 
 Model (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS  Model (4) IV
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value  coeff p-value
Bonus (0,1) -0.0158** 0.0269        
Bonus value   -0.0021** 0.0381      
Scaled bonus     -0.0179* 0.0582    
Fitted bonus         -0.0160** 0.0283
Target characteristics          
Non-compete index -0.0016 0.4559 -0.0017 0.4477 -0.0018 0.4250    
Size -0.0022 0.5671 -0.0020 0.5944 -0.0023 0.5532  -0.0045 0.2578
M/B -0.0001 0.6214 -0.0001 0.6241 -0.0001 0.6685  -0.0001 0.6718
Leverage -0.0129 0.5454 -0.0130 0.5440 -0.0099 0.6453  -0.0177 0.4086
Operating cash flow -0.0090 0.6889 -0.0091 0.6861 -0.0117 0.6027  -0.0042 0.8537
Liquidity  -0.0315 0.1573 -0.0313 0.1601 -0.0302 0.1756  -0.0220 0.3304
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0034 0.6503 -0.0032 0.6746 -0.0018 0.8070  -0.0042 0.5778
Earnings management (0,1) -0.0030 0.7312 -0.0027 0.7548 -0.0017 0.8479  -0.0014 0.8732
Acquirer characteristics          
Size -0.0084*** 0.0073 -0.0084*** 0.0076 -0.0084*** 0.0079  -0.0081*** 0.0087
M/B 0.0015*** 0.0072 0.0015*** 0.0077 0.0015*** 0.0087  0.0015*** 0.0077
Leverage -0.0153 0.5168 -0.0155 0.5116 -0.0138 0.5611  -0.0111 0.6388
Operating cash flow -0.0206 0.3509 -0.0203 0.3572 -0.0182 0.4096  -0.0149 0.5011
Liquidity  -0.0551** 0.0223 -0.0545** 0.0239 -0.0532** 0.0274  -0.0507** 0.0350
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0058 0.1795 -0.0058 0.1836 -0.0057 0.1897  -0.0047 0.2823
Target CEO characteristics          
CEO-chairman (0,1)  -0.0051 0.4608 -0.0054 0.4414 -0.0059 0.3979  -0.0010 0.8945
CEO-founder (0,1)   -0.0118 0.2594 -0.0118 0.2623 -0.0107 0.3091  -0.0134 0.2049
CEO near retirement age (0,1) -0.0067 0.4488 -0.0065 0.4671 -0.0054 0.5459  -0.0057 0.5214
CEO stock and option ownership  0.0248 0.2595 0.0249 0.2587 0.0260 0.2391  0.0308 0.1624
Golden parachute  0.0060 0.2518 0.0061 0.2427 0.0057 0.2764  0.0034 0.5279
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  -0.0155 0.1858 -0.0158 0.1780 -0.0164 0.1624  -0.0122 0.3047
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) 0.0086 0.2773 0.0087 0.2744 0.0093 0.2423  0.0099 0.2094
Post-deal employment (0,1)  -0.0097 0.1292 -0.0096 0.1315 -0.0095 0.1404  -0.0087 0.1766
Target governance characteristics          
Entrenchment index  -0.0020 0.4343 -0.0020 0.4466 -0.0019 0.4723  -0.0011 0.6844
Board size 0.0012 0.3671 0.0012 0.3648 0.0013 0.3521  0.0017 0.2082
Board ownership  0.0256 0.1944 0.0259 0.1889 0.0271 0.1703  0.0245 0.2150
Independent board (0,1) -0.0054 0.6028 -0.0053 0.6131 -0.0044 0.6747  -0.0028 0.7861
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  0.0037 0.5891 0.0038 0.5824 0.0025 0.7165  0.0047 0.4970
Institutional ownership  -0.0083 0.7088 -0.0087 0.6963 -0.0102 0.6492  -0.0070 0.7524
Deal characteristics          
Relative size (Target/Acquirer) 0.0225*** 0.0007 0.0226*** 0.0007 0.0229*** 0.0006  0.0231*** 0.0004
Toehold 0.0011 0.1512 0.0010 0.1624 0.0010 0.1648  0.0012* 0.0944
Cash payment (0,1)  0.0245*** 0.0018 0.0245*** 0.0019 0.0246*** 0.0018  0.0193** 0.0196
Tender offer (0,1) 0.0042 0.6509 0.0044 0.6378 0.0055 0.5535  -0.0021 0.8373
Hostile (0,1) 0.0122 0.3779 0.0123 0.3754 0.0119 0.3925  0.0158 0.2578
Competed deal (0,1) -0.0120 0.2522 -0.0119 0.2580 -0.0121 0.2520  -0.0163 0.1253
Target termination fee (0,1) -0.0196** 0.0137 -0.0194** 0.0145 -0.0196** 0.0135  -0.0168** 0.0372
Lockup (0,1) -0.0076 0.8289 -0.0068 0.8465 -0.0101 0.7731  0.0008 0.9821
Same industry (0,1) 0.0059 0.4225 0.0056 0.4541 0.0053 0.4722  0.0042 0.5726
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.0503** 0.0201 -0.0501** 0.0206 -0.0500** 0.0212  -0.0567*** 0.0098
Target initiated deal (0,1) -0.0118* 0.0803 -0.0118* 0.0803 -0.0126* 0.0620  -0.0117* 0.0831
Acquirer input / Total target output -0.1728 0.1381 -0.1709 0.1428 -0.1591 0.1724  -0.1732 0.1374
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales 0.1397 0.1548 0.1398 0.1550 0.1292 0.1892  0.1352 0.1684
Target industry M&A liquidity index -0.0152 0.4718 -0.0150 0.4768 -0.0118 0.5745  -0.0223 0.3036
One year macroeconomic change -0.0023 0.2083 -0.0022 0.2203 -0.0020 0.2656  -0.0019 0.3081
Constant 0.2124*** 0.0035 0.2099*** 0.0038 0.2031*** 0.0051  0.2192*** 0.0026
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
N 497  497  497   497  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001   0.0001  
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Table 6: Merger bonus and acquirer returns 
 
From the original 949 M&A bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1, we examine 497 offers made by U.S. public 
bidders with available data from CRSP, Compustat and RiskMetrics. We run acquirer return regressions similar to those in Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). All variables are defined in the Appendix. The reported p-
values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = Acquirer deal announcement CAR (-1,+1) 
 Model (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS  Model (4) IV
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value  coeff p-value
Bonus (0,1) -0.0184** 0.0335        
Bonus value   -0.0029** 0.0200      
Scaled bonus     -0.0294** 0.0100    
Fitted bonus         -0.0230** 0.0227
Target characteristics          
Non-compete index -0.0027 0.2906 -0.0027 0.2849 -0.0028 0.2630    
Size 0.0054 0.1235 0.0054 0.1181 0.0058* 0.0976  0.0055 0.1116
M/B -0.0001 0.6978 -0.0001 0.6805 -0.0001 0.7046  -0.0001 0.6657
Leverage 0.0105 0.6539 0.0105 0.6521 0.0147 0.5293  0.0009 0.9699
Operating cash flow -0.0153 0.5207 -0.0153 0.5210 -0.0193 0.4179  0.0029 0.9099
Liquidity  -0.0332 0.2003 -0.0336 0.1951 -0.0333 0.1981  -0.0158 0.5552
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0017 0.7804 -0.0015 0.8054 -0.0009 0.8769  -0.0017 0.7768
Earnings management (0,1) -0.0050 0.6138 -0.0050 0.6184 -0.0043 0.6688  -0.0041 0.6788
Acquirer characteristics          
Size -0.0164*** 0.0002 -0.0163*** 0.0002 -0.0167*** 0.0002  -0.0214*** 0.0001
M/B 0.0020*** 0.0065 0.0020*** 0.0067 0.0020*** 0.0057  0.0020*** 0.0046
Leverage -0.0549 0.1485 -0.0568 0.1347 -0.0551 0.1461  -0.0468 0.2164
Operating cash flow -0.0023 0.2973 -0.0023 0.2978 -0.0020 0.3435  -0.0021 0.3422
Liquidity  -0.0644** 0.0135 -0.0639** 0.0140 -0.0639** 0.0139  -0.0648** 0.0128
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0106 0.1586 0.0107 0.1535 0.0106 0.1570  0.0089 0.2344
Target CEO characteristics          
CEO-chairman (0,1)  -0.0001 0.9942 0.0000 0.9985 -0.0003 0.9661  0.0096 0.3218
CEO-founder (0,1)   -0.0118 0.3309 -0.0119 0.3277 -0.0103 0.3931  -0.0185 0.1439
CEO near retirement age (0,1) 0.0023 0.8214 0.0024 0.8183 0.0035 0.7370  0.0024 0.8129
CEO stock and option ownership  0.0281 0.2928 0.0277 0.2989 0.0296 0.2659  0.0388 0.1458
Golden parachute  0.0056 0.3557 0.0056 0.3564 0.0047 0.4460  0.0011 0.8614
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  -0.0210 0.1271 -0.0213 0.1208 -0.0227* 0.0963  -0.0101 0.4954
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) 0.0226** 0.0135 0.0225** 0.0138 0.0232** 0.0110  0.0259*** 0.0052
Post-deal employment (0,1)  -0.0030 0.6903 -0.0027 0.7128 -0.0021 0.7762  0.0009 0.9054
Target governance characteristics          
Entrenchment index  0.0000 0.9918 0.0001 0.9696 0.0003 0.9309  0.0034 0.3469
Board size 0.0012 0.4590 0.0012 0.4571 0.0012 0.4553  0.0023 0.1655
Board ownership  -0.0167 0.4831 -0.0165 0.4880 -0.0153 0.5182  -0.0219 0.3627
Independent board (0,1) 0.0103 0.3834 0.0102 0.3861 0.0108 0.3580  0.0125 0.2876
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  0.0070 0.3939 0.0073 0.3738 0.0046 0.5724  0.0135 0.1423
Institutional ownership  -0.0014 0.9588 -0.0019 0.9424 -0.0061 0.8142  0.0051 0.8485
Deal characteristics          
Relative size (Target/Acquirer) -0.0151** 0.0381 -0.0150** 0.0397 -0.0145** 0.0458  -0.0140* 0.0527
Toehold -0.0273 0.1938 -0.0277 0.1880 -0.0265 0.2059  -0.0349 0.1044
Cash payment (0,1)  0.0258*** 0.0053 0.0257*** 0.0054 0.0259*** 0.0049  0.0153 0.1387
Tender offer (0,1) -0.0012 0.9132 -0.0015 0.8871 -0.0007 0.9501  -0.0182 0.1926
Hostile (0,1) 0.0051 0.7531 0.0052 0.7460 0.0047 0.7705  0.0124 0.4524
Competed deal (0,1) 0.0012 0.9240 0.0012 0.9236 0.0008 0.9492  -0.0038 0.7521
Target termination fee (0,1) -0.0134 0.1545 -0.0132 0.1603 -0.0132 0.1577  -0.0074 0.4476
Lockup (0,1) -0.0181 0.6550 -0.0168 0.6786 -0.0228 0.5718  0.0013 0.9747
Same industry (0,1) -0.0021 0.8177 -0.0026 0.7748 -0.0030 0.7436  -0.0075 0.4324
Merger of equals (0,1) 0.0221 0.3943 0.0219 0.3968 0.0218 0.3981  0.0086 0.7467
Target initiated deal (0,1) -0.0013 0.8722 -0.0012 0.8798 -0.0017 0.8287  0.0013 0.8659
Acquirer input / Total target output 0.0026 0.9900 0.0094 0.9640 0.0331 0.8735  -0.0933 0.6641
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales 0.1530 0.4337 0.1566 0.4224 0.1643 0.3992  0.1468 0.4518
Target industry M&A liquidity index -0.0283 0.1848 -0.0285 0.1801 -0.0241 0.2532  -0.0473** 0.0467
One year macroeconomic change 0.0017 0.4196 0.0017 0.4136 0.0018 0.3954  0.0022 0.2894
Constant 0.0735 0.4597 0.0711 0.4735 0.0705 0.4768  0.0978 0.3324
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
N 497  497  497   497  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001   0.0001  
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Table 7: Merger bonus and post-acquisition performance 
 
From the original 949 M&A bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1, we examine 417 completed deals made by 
U.S. public bidders with available data from CRSP, Compustat and RiskMetrics. We run three-year post-deal operating gain 
regressions similar to those in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) and Harford, Humphrey-Jenner, and Powell (2012). All variables 
are defined in the Appendix. The reported p-values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = Post-deal combined industry-adjusted ROA 
 Model (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS  Model (4) IV
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value  coeff p-value
Bonus (0,1) -0.0163** 0.0306        
Bonus value   -0.0017** 0.0283      
Scaled bonus     -0.0057** 0.0282    
Fitted bonus         -0.0211** 0.0205
Pre-merger combined ROA 0.6294*** 0.0001 0.6287*** 0.0001 0.6289*** 0.0001  0.6240*** 0.0001
Target characteristics          
Non-compete index -0.0027 0.2321 -0.0027 0.2334 -0.0027 0.2347    
Size -0.0001 0.9806 0.0003 0.9371 0.0005 0.8903  -0.0041 0.3433
M/B 0.0072* 0.0537 0.0071* 0.0589 0.0068* 0.0680  0.0070* 0.0591
Leverage -0.0193 0.3448 -0.0186 0.3627 -0.0167 0.4168  -0.0276 0.1801
Operating cash flow 0.0251 0.2578 0.0238 0.2854 0.0206 0.3536  0.0371 0.1207
Liquidity  -0.0091 0.7015 -0.0089 0.7092 -0.0077 0.7489  0.0079 0.7533
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0005 0.9289 0.0006 0.9075 0.0008 0.8827  0.0015 0.7764
Earnings management (0,1) 0.0105 0.2425 0.0106 0.2402 0.0109 0.2265  0.0109 0.2225
Acquirer characteristics          
Size 0.0004 0.8971 0.0004 0.9065 0.0003 0.9203  0.0004 0.8991
M/B -0.0010 0.6202 -0.0009 0.6504 -0.0007 0.7334  -0.0004 0.8177
Leverage -0.0566 0.1042 -0.0573 0.1013 -0.0564 0.1083  -0.0583* 0.0953
Operating cash flow 0.0020 0.5943 0.0021 0.5792 0.0023 0.5357  0.0025 0.5020
Liquidity  -0.0549** 0.0225 -0.0540** 0.0252 -0.0531** 0.0281  -0.0549** 0.0229
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0117* 0.0853 0.0112* 0.0976 0.0104 0.1243  0.0101 0.1344
Target CEO characteristics          
CEO-chairman (0,1)  0.0045 0.5353 0.0040 0.5859 0.0031 0.6687  0.0124 0.1631
CEO-founder (0,1)   0.0007 0.9496 0.0009 0.9339 0.0017 0.8821  -0.0053 0.6551
CEO near retirement age (0,1) -0.0139 0.1294 -0.0133 0.1465 -0.0125 0.1757  -0.0139 0.1317
CEO stock and option ownership  -0.0023 0.9169 -0.0017 0.9382 0.0002 0.9925  0.0062 0.7806
Golden parachute  -0.0003 0.8285 -0.0003 0.8488 -0.0003 0.8315  -0.0015 0.3583
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  -0.0001 0.9962 -0.0007 0.9574 -0.0014 0.9094  0.0077 0.5590
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) -0.0025 0.7642 -0.0026 0.7494 -0.0028 0.7398  -0.0006 0.9460
Post-deal employment (0,1)  -0.0075 0.2659 -0.0079 0.2421 -0.0086 0.2059  -0.0042 0.5536
Target governance characteristics          
Entrenchment index  0.0003 0.9295 0.0001 0.9775 -0.0004 0.8950  0.0027 0.4276
Board size 0.0011 0.4427 0.0010 0.4680 0.0009 0.5060  0.0021 0.1721
Board ownership  -0.0232 0.2768 -0.0222 0.2994 -0.0210 0.3276  -0.0264 0.2213
Independent board (0,1) -0.0104 0.3481 -0.0103 0.3546 -0.0098 0.3812  -0.0071 0.5234
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  0.0012 0.8659 0.0009 0.8970 -0.0005 0.9496  0.0068 0.4071
Institutional ownership  0.0124 0.5967 0.0116 0.6215 0.0100 0.6706  0.0195 0.4209
Deal characteristics          
Relative size (Target/Acquirer) 0.0073 0.4393 0.0073 0.4386 0.0073 0.4409  0.0089 0.3495
Toehold -0.0028** 0.0274 -0.0029** 0.0265 -0.0029** 0.0270  -0.0034** 0.0113
Cash payment (0,1)  0.0143* 0.0866 0.0143* 0.0865 0.0147* 0.0798  0.0063 0.4988
Tender offer (0,1) 0.0048 0.6298 0.0056 0.5759 0.0072 0.4684  -0.0088 0.5003
Hostile (0,1) -0.0005 0.9707 -0.0006 0.9679 -0.0015 0.9168  0.0049 0.7459
Competed deal (0,1) -0.0033 0.7559 -0.0031 0.7699 -0.0028 0.7936  -0.0075 0.4855
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.0008 0.9202 0.0008 0.9238 0.0005 0.9527  0.0056 0.5318
Lockup (0,1) 0.0133 0.6885 0.0126 0.7061 0.0088 0.7930  0.0308 0.3862
Same industry (0,1) -0.0082 0.3062 -0.0084 0.2953 -0.0082 0.3140  -0.0125 0.1388
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.0191 0.4158 -0.0187 0.4273 -0.0181 0.4430  -0.0330 0.1806
Target initiated deal (0,1) 0.0057 0.4369 0.0057 0.4383 0.0053 0.4724  0.0082 0.2707
Acquirer input / Total target output 0.0336 0.8614 0.0462 0.8107 0.0602 0.7559  -0.0241 0.9033
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales -0.3106* 0.0636 -0.3120* 0.0632 -0.3188* 0.0585  -0.3226* 0.0543
Target industry M&A liquidity index -0.0103 0.5780 -0.0090 0.6280 -0.0055 0.7646  -0.0240 0.2494
One year macroeconomic change 0.0024 0.2172 0.0024 0.2114 0.0025 0.1986  0.0031 0.1207
Constant 0.1002 0.2479 0.0949 0.2747 0.0910 0.2974  0.1150 0.1935
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
N 417  417  417   417  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001   0.0001  
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Table 8: Merger bonus and division of merger gains  
 
From the original 949 M&A bids announced during 1999-2009 described in Table 1, we examine 417 completed deals made by 
U.S. public bidders with available data from CRSP, Compustat and RiskMetrics. We run regressions of the relative gain of the 
target vs the acquirer per dollar of total market value similar to those in Ahern (2012). All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
The reported p-values are White (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable = Relative gain of target vs acquirer per dollar of total market value 
 Model (1) OLS Model (2) OLS Model (3) OLS  Model (4) IV
 coeff p-value coeff p-value coeff p-value  coeff p-value
Bonus (0,1) 0.0158** 0.0316        
Bonus value   0.0027** 0.0119      
Scaled bonus     0.0294*** 0.0032    
Fitted bonus         0.0346* 0.0511
Target characteristics          
Non-compete index 0.0025 0.2516 0.0025 0.2466 0.0026 0.2337    
Size 0.0268*** 0.0001 0.0268*** 0.0001 0.0274*** 0.0001  0.0278*** 0.0001
M/B 0.0000 0.8886 0.0000 0.8625 0.0000 0.9139  0.0000 0.9269
Leverage -0.0773*** 0.0070 -0.0776*** 0.0067 -0.0846*** 0.0032  -0.0724** 0.0125
Operating cash flow 0.0007 0.9727 0.0005 0.9815 0.0044 0.8345  -0.0013 0.9524
Liquidity  -0.0031 0.8944 -0.0027 0.9084 -0.0037 0.8712  -0.0089 0.7115
Prior year market adjusted return -0.0329*** 0.0001 -0.0331*** 0.0001 -0.0330*** 0.0001  -0.0315*** 0.0001
Earnings management (0,1) -0.0123 0.1557 -0.0123 0.1545 -0.0133 0.1212  -0.0133 0.1271
Acquirer characteristics          
Size -0.0185*** 0.0001 -0.0186*** 0.0001 -0.0189*** 0.0001  -0.0187*** 0.0001
M/B -0.0004 0.5765 -0.0003 0.5927 -0.0004 0.5459  -0.0004 0.4984
Leverage 0.1020*** 0.0024 0.1041*** 0.0019 0.1039*** 0.0019  0.0967*** 0.0042
Operating cash flow -0.0013 0.4906 -0.0013 0.4968 -0.0014 0.4412  -0.0016 0.3932
Liquidity  0.0771*** 0.0007 0.0768*** 0.0007 0.0759*** 0.0008  0.0749*** 0.0010
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0010 0.8409 0.0009 0.8693 0.0001 0.9868  0.0008 0.8760
Target CEO characteristics          
CEO-chairman (0,1)  0.0024 0.7366 0.0022 0.7549 0.0021 0.7698  0.0013 0.8808
CEO-founder (0,1)   0.0088 0.4049 0.0090 0.3949 0.0076 0.4716  0.0093 0.4000
CEO near retirement age (0,1) -0.0080 0.3724 -0.0080 0.3756 -0.0090 0.3130  -0.0098 0.2799
CEO stock and option ownership  -0.0138 0.5543 -0.0132 0.5703 -0.0146 0.5266  -0.0197 0.4003
Golden parachute  -0.0033 0.5296 -0.0033 0.5349 -0.0022 0.6801  -0.0024 0.6784
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  0.0218* 0.0685 0.0219* 0.0659 0.0229* 0.0533  0.0198 0.1274
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) -0.0199** 0.0126 -0.0198** 0.0129 -0.0205*** 0.0096  -0.0207** 0.0109
Post-deal employment (0,1)  0.0079 0.2225 0.0076 0.2397 0.0067 0.2977  0.0074 0.2716
Target governance characteristics          
Entrenchment index  -0.0015 0.5759 -0.0017 0.5289 -0.0019 0.4831  -0.0018 0.5774
Board size -0.0005 0.7097 -0.0005 0.6984 -0.0006 0.6499  -0.0007 0.6218
Board ownership  0.0260 0.2103 0.0259 0.2111 0.0251 0.2244  0.0266 0.2070
Independent board (0,1) 0.0012 0.9076 0.0013 0.8999 0.0006 0.9518  0.0000 0.9966
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  -0.0021 0.7635 -0.0026 0.7154 -0.0004 0.9514  -0.0021 0.7916
Institutional ownership  -0.0139 0.5388 -0.0136 0.5477 -0.0105 0.6412  -0.0144 0.5349
Deal characteristics          
Relative size (Target/Acquirer) -0.0011 0.8677 -0.0012 0.8550 -0.0015 0.8081  -0.0024 0.7064
Toehold -0.0066 0.7137 -0.0062 0.7327 -0.0061 0.7359  -0.0055 0.7677
Cash payment (0,1)  0.0061 0.4399 0.0063 0.4275 0.0066 0.4046  0.0091 0.3166
Tender offer (0,1) 0.0082 0.3878 0.0087 0.3560 0.0084 0.3730  0.0105 0.3924
Hostile (0,1) 0.0199 0.1600 0.0197 0.1634 0.0200 0.1546  0.0178 0.2180
Competed deal (0,1) -0.0144 0.1714 -0.0144 0.1715 -0.0138 0.1888  -0.0126 0.2381
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.0170** 0.0377 0.0168** 0.0395 0.0166** 0.0410  0.0157* 0.0679
Lockup (0,1) -0.0035 0.9213 -0.0052 0.8830 -0.0013 0.9699  -0.0037 0.9211
Same industry (0,1) 0.0093 0.2373 0.0099 0.2119 0.0104 0.1884  0.0097 0.2459
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.0735*** 0.0012 -0.0731*** 0.0012 -0.0723*** 0.0013  -0.0707*** 0.0027
Target initiated deal (0,1) -0.0029 0.6738 -0.0030 0.6609 -0.0025 0.7142  -0.0030 0.6651
Acquirer input / Total target output -0.1464 0.4203 -0.1514 0.4031 -0.1779 0.3242  -0.1453 0.4394
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales -0.3150* 0.0642 -0.3180* 0.0611 -0.3208* 0.0581  -0.3037* 0.0758
Target industry M&A liquidity index 0.0122 0.5109 0.0128 0.4902 0.0091 0.6191  0.0137 0.5098
One year macroeconomic change 0.0025 0.1682 0.0025 0.1704 0.0024 0.1872  0.0024 0.2011
Constant -0.0033 0.9689 -0.0018 0.9833 -0.0025 0.9761  0.0088 0.9179
Year and industry fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes  
N 417  417  417   417  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001   0.0001  
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Table 9: Propensity score matching estimates 
 
In Panel A, we report the propensity score matching estimates, the sample means of the treatment and control samples, and the p-
values of the difference in means. In Panel B, we report the average treatment effects on deal performance where the treatment is 
defined as situations in which the target CEO is given a bonus. Matching estimates use the Gaussian kernel with a fixed bandwidth 
of 0.10. We report the p-value of the treatment effects using 500 bootstrap repetitions in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Propensity score model estimates for merger bonus 
 Dependent variable = Bonus (0,1) 
Treatment 
sample mean 
Control sample 
mean 
p-value for 
difference 
Target characteristics     
Non-compete index 0.1376** 5.6530 5.6400 0.9139 
Size -0.2786*** 7.4890 7.4110 0.6017 
M/B -0.0025 2.8000 3.5020 0.5393 
Leverage -0.5408 0.1760 0.1680 0.5744 
Operating cash flow 0.7786 -0.0290 0.0000 0.2413 
Liquidity  0.6044 0.1860 0.1850 0.9651 
Prior year market adjusted return 0.0441 -0.0280 0.0350 0.1948 
Earnings management (0,1) -0.3836 0.1640 0.1470 0.6186 
Target CEO characteristics     
CEO-chairman (0,1)  0.5128** 0.6260 0.6780 0.2577 
CEO-founder (0,1)   -0.3580 0.1140 0.0850 0.3200 
CEO near retirement age (0,1) -0.1303 0.1690 0.1800 0.7614 
CEO stock and option ownership  0.4003 0.0520 0.0420 0.3124 
Golden parachute  -0.0756** 6.4820 6.7810 0.2611 
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  0.4957 0.0870 0.0760 0.6795 
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) 0.2010 0.1690 0.1710 0.9634 
Post-deal employment (0,1)  0.1818 0.6210 0.6400 0.6872 
Target governance characteristics     
Entrenchment index  0.2037*** 2.3790 2.3740 0.9698 
Board size 0.0691* 9.0780 8.8910 0.5295 
Board ownership  -1.1323 0.0610 0.0750 0.4046 
Independent board (0,1) 0.2758 0.8810 0.8910 0.7519 
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  0.3850* 0.5480 0.5730 0.5951 
Institutional ownership  0.5820 0.2380 0.2420 0.8243 
Deal characteristics     
Private acquirer (0,1) -0.2477 0.1640 0.1470 0.6186 
Toehold -0.0272 0.8450 0.7090 0.7448 
Cash payment (0,1)  -0.5239** 0.4380 0.4030 0.4570 
Tender offer (0,1) -1.0535*** 0.0910 0.0900 0.9633 
Hostile (0,1) 0.6051 0.0270 0.0330 0.7272 
Competed deal (0,1) -0.3953 0.1000 0.0950 0.8435 
Target termination fee (0,1) 0.3166 0.7810 0.7960 0.6970 
Lockup (0,1) 1.1954* 0.0320 0.0280 0.8314 
Same industry (0,1) -0.2546 0.5620 0.5640 0.9612 
Merger of equals (0,1) -0.6833 0.0230 0.0280 0.7136 
Target initiated deal (0,1) 0.1370 0.3970 0.4360 0.4162 
Acquirer input / Total target output -6.4257 0.0260 0.0260 0.8357 
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales -0.0457 0.0330 0.0330 0.9603 
Target industry M&A liquidity index -0.9161* 0.4220 0.4220 0.9721 
One year macroeconomic change 0.0195 1.6030 1.7210 0.2665 
Constant -10.3028    
Year and industry fixed effects Yes    
N  219 210  
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Panel B: Average treatment effect on deal performance for merger bonus 
Performance measures  
(Bonus = 1 vs. Bonus = 0) 
Treatment 
N 
Control 
N 
Average treatment effect  
(p-value) 
Four week target premium  219 210 -0.0526** 
   (0.0296) 
Synergy 125 123 -0.0211** 
   (0.0130) 
Acquirer CAR (-1,+1)  125 123 -0.0194** 
   (0.0399) 
Merged firm post-deal operating performance (yr-1,yr+3)  110 109 -0.0227** 
   (0.0426) 
Relative gain of target vs acquirer per dollar of total market value 110 109 0.0127* 
   (0.0722) 
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Table 10: Accounting irregularities 
 
In this table, we estimate the effect of merger bonuses on deal performance in the presence of accounting irregularities measured 
by earnings management and SEC enforcement. There are 192 instances of earnings management and 46 instances of SEC 
enforcement actions in the sample. In Panel A, we report correlations and/or Chi-square tests for the relationship between the two 
accounting irregularity measures and the target’s corporate governance variables. In model (1) of Panels B to F, we add the 
interaction term between merger bonus (0,1) and earnings management (0,1) to the original regressions in model (1) of Tables 4 to 
8, respectively. In model (2) of each panel, we replace earnings management (0,1) with SEC enforcement (0,1). *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Correlations 
 Accounting irregularity = Earnings management (0,1)  
Accounting irregularity = 
SEC enforcement (0,1) 
 Correlation p-value  Correlation p-value 
CEO-chairman (0,1) 0.0527* 0.0647  0.0658** 0.0428 
Entrenchment index  0.0213 0.5125  0.0055 0.8657 
Board size 0.0363 0.2640  -0.0416 0.2002 
Board ownership  -0.0517* 0.0705  -0.0301 0.3549 
Independent board (0,1) -0.0511* 0.0759  -0.0596* 0.0713
Handpicked compensation committee (0,1)  0.0730** 0.0280  0.0685** 0.0350 
Institutional ownership  -0.0062 0.8491  -0.0048 0.8824 
 
Panel B: Acquisition premiums 
Dependent variable = Four week SDC acquisition premium Model (1)  Model (2)
 Accounting irregularity = Earnings management (0,1)  
Accounting irregularity = 
SEC enforcement (0,1) 
 coeff p-value  coeff p-value 
Bonus (0,1) -0.0381** 0.0332  -0.0387** 0.0287 
Bonus (0,1) × Accounting irregularity (0,1) -0.0197** 0.0379  -0.0247*** 0.0042 
Accounting irregularity (0,1) -0.0415** 0.0311  -0.0623* 0.0765 
Other control variables as in Table 4 Model (1) Yes   Yes  
      
Joint value: Bonus (0,1) + interaction term (p-value of F-test) -0.0578*** 0.0025  -0.0634*** 0.0010 
      
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
N 949   949  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001   0.0001  
 
Panel C: Acquisition synergies 
Dependent variable = Acquisition synergy Model (1)  Model (2)
 Accounting irregularity = Earnings management (0,1)  
Accounting irregularity = 
SEC enforcement (0,1) 
 coeff p-value  coeff p-value 
Bonus (0,1) -0.0206*** 0.0045  -0.0169** 0.0175 
Bonus (0,1) × Accounting irregularity (0,1) 0.0384*** 0.0034  0.0318* 0.0517 
Accounting irregularity (0,1) -0.0086 0.3307  -0.0133 0.4037 
Other control variables as in Table 5 Model (1) Yes   Yes  
      
Joint value: Bonus (0,1) + interaction term (p-value of F-test) 0.0178** 0.0185  0.0149** 0.0385 
      
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
N 497   497  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001   0.0001  
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Panel D: Acquirer returns 
Dependent variable = Acquirer announcement CAR (-1,+1) Model (1)  Model (2)
 Accounting irregularity = Earnings management (0,1)  
Accounting irregularity = 
SEC enforcement (0,1) 
 coeff p-value  coeff p-value 
Bonus (0,1) -0.0195** 0.0281  -0.0152* 0.0808 
Bonus (0,1) × Accounting irregularity (0,1) 0.0400** 0.0106  0.0402** 0.0400 
Accounting irregularity (0,1) -0.0141 0.1785  -0.0071 0.7112 
Other control variables as in Table 6 Model (1) Yes   Yes  
      
Joint value: Bonus (0,1) + interaction term (p-value of F-test) 0.0205** 0.0195  0.0250** 0.0229 
      
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
N 497   497  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001   0.0001  
  
Panel E: Post-acquisition performance 
Dependent variable = Post-deal combined industry-adj ROA Model (1)  Model (2)
 Accounting irregularity = Earnings management (0,1)  
Accounting irregularity = 
SEC enforcement (0,1) 
 coeff p-value  coeff p-value 
Bonus (0,1) -0.0138* 0.0668  -0.0156** 0.0399 
Bonus (0,1) × Accounting irregularity (0,1) 0.0311** 0.0318  0.0270* 0.0685 
Accounting irregularity (0,1) 0.0008 0.9354  -0.0064 0.6873 
Other control variables as in Table 7 Model (1) Yes   Yes  
      
Joint value: Bonus (0,1) + interaction term (p-value of F-test) 0.0173** 0.0238  0.0114* 0.0964 
      
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
N 417   417  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001   0.0001  
 
Panel F: Division of merger gains 
Dependent variable = Relative gain of target vs acquirer Model (1)  Model (2)
 Accounting irregularity = Earnings management (0,1)  
Accounting irregularity = 
SEC enforcement (0,1) 
 coeff p-value  coeff p-value 
Bonus (0,1) 0.0161** 0.0349  0.0140* 0.0591 
Bonus (0,1) × Accounting irregularity (0,1) -0.0295** 0.0291  -0.0322* 0.0572 
Accounting irregularity (0,1) -0.0087 0.3362  -0.0183 0.2737 
Other control variables as in Table 8 Model (1) Yes   Yes  
      
Joint value: Bonus (0,1) + interaction term (p-value of F-test) -0.0134* 0.0896  -0.0182** 0.0304 
      
Year and industry fixed effects Yes   Yes  
N 417   417  
Regression’s p-value 0.0001   0.0001  
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Table 11: Additional analyses 
 
In Panel A, we estimate the mean and median premiums, acquirer returns and synergies for subsamples based on whether the bonus 
prevents competition by the target CEO. In Panel B, we estimate the mean and median premiums, acquirer returns and synergies 
for subsamples based on whether the target CEO has large incentives: (1) the golden parachute value is in the top quartile of all 
CEOs in the sample, or (2) the value of the CEO’s existing stock and option holdings is in the top quartile of all CEOs in the 
sample, or (3) the CEO negotiates an increase in the value of an existing golden parachute, or (4) the CEO gets unscheduled option 
grants during merger negotiations. In Panel C and Panel D, we estimate the effect of merger bonuses using alternative measures of 
acquisition premiums and acquirer returns, respectively. We report the coefficients for the interaction variables separately included 
in each regression and p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bonus objective 
Performance measures  
Mean 
[Median] 
Bonus with  
competition allowed 
(N=68) 
Bonus with  
non-compete 
(N=151) 
Difference 
t  
[z] 
Premium  0.2495 0.3324 -2.20** 
 [0.2114] [0.2930] [-2.66***] 
Synergy 0.0262 -0.0177 3.17*** 
 [0.0221] [-0.0093] [3.31***] 
Acquirer CAR (-1,+1)  -0.0111 -0.0514 2.49** 
 [-0.0126] [-0.0435] [2.75***] 
 
Panel B : Incentive strength 
Performance measures  
Mean 
[Median] 
Bonus together with  
other large incentives 
(N=72) 
Other  
bonuses 
(N=147) 
Difference 
t  
[z] 
Premium  0.2561 0.3314 -2.03** 
 [0.2265] [0.2579] [-2.24**] 
Synergy 0.0077 -0.0154 1.79* 
 [0.0005] [-0.0101] [1.93*] 
Acquirer CAR (-1,+1)  -0.0225 -0.0535 2.19** 
 [-0.0189] [-0.0489] [2.47**] 
 
Panel C: Target premium and return alternatives 
 Target CAR(-20,+1) Target CAR(-42,+126) Combined premium 
Bonus (0,1) -0.0385** -0.0423** -0.0528** 
 (0.0277) (0.0189) (0.0369) 
Bonus (0,1) × Earnings management (0,1) -0.0156* -0.0227* -0.0389** 
 (0.0670) (0.0516) (0.0189) 
Bonus (0,1) × SEC enforcement (0,1)  -0.0241** -0.0367** -0.0387*** 
 (0.0013) (0.0192) (0.0013) 
 
Panel D: Acquirer return alternatives 
 Acquirer CAR(-2,+2) Acquirer CAR(-5,+5) 
Bonus (0,1) -0.0173** -0.0128* 
 (0.0365) (0.0812) 
Bonus (0,1) × Earnings management (0,1) 0.0327* 0.0202* 
 (0.0223) (0.0790) 
Bonus (0,1) × SEC enforcement (0,1)  0.0335* 0.0323** 
 (0.0554) (0.0462) 
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Appendix: Variable definitions 
 
Merger bonus proxies  
Bonus (0,1) one if the target CEO receive a merger bonus and zero otherwise 
Bonus value the natural logarithm of the merger bonus value and zero if the bonus is not offered 
Scaled bonus the merger bonus value scaled by the target CEO’s total compensation during the 
year prior to the merger announcement and zero if the bonus is not offered 
Fitted bonus the fitted value of bonus obtained from the first stage regression of the probability 
of having a merger bonus (Model (1) of Table 3)  
Financial characteristics  
Non-compete index Garmaise (2011)’s enforceability index which measures the enforcement level of 
non-compete agreements for executives in different U.S. states. A lower non-
compete index means less enforceability. 
Size the natural logarithm of the market value of assets  
M/B the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
Leverage the book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt and market value 
of equity. 
OCF the cash flow from operations scaled by the value of assets  
Liquidity the net liquid assets (net working capital) scaled by the value of assets  
ROA the operating income before depreciation divided by the average of beginning- 
and ending-period book value of assets 
Pre-merger combined ROA the combined acquirer-target industry-adjusted ROA for the fiscal year before the 
takeover 
Prior year market adjusted return the cumulative abnormal return during the one year window ending four weeks 
prior to the merger announcement, calculated as the residual from the market 
model estimated during the year before 
Earnings management (0,1) one if the discretionary current accruals (using the modified Jones (1991) model 
proposed by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995)) is above its industry 
median in each of the three fiscal years before the merger announcement date. 
SEC enforcement (0,1) one if the firm is subject to an SEC enforcement action after merger resolution, 
due to accounting violations that were present at the fiscal year end before 
the merger announcement. 
CEO characteristics  
CEO-chairman (0,1)  one if the CEO is the chairman of the board 
CEO-founder (0,1)   one if the CEO is among the firm’s founders 
CEO near retirement age (0,1) one if the CEO is at least 62 years old at the time of the merger announcement 
CEO stock and option ownership  the equity owned by the CEO as a proportion of the firm’s shares outstanding 
Golden parachute  the natural logarithm of the golden parachute payment estimated for the target 
CEO before the acquisition 
Parachute augmentation (0,1)  one if the target board increases the parachute value for the target CEO at the time 
of the acquisition as in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) 
Unscheduled option grant (0,1) one if the target CEO receives an unscheduled option award during merger 
negotiations as in Fich, Cai, and Tran (2011) 
Post-deal employment (0,1)  one if the target CEO already holds or obtains either a directorship or an executive 
appointment such as CEO of the acquirer or a subsidiary, chief financial 
officer, chief operating officer, chairman, vice-chairman, president, or vice-
president in the bidder firm after deal completion. In case of withdrawn deals, 
it equals one if the target CEO already holds any of the positions just 
described or if the merger proxy states that the target CEO will be employed 
by the bidder upon deal completion 
Target governance characteristics  
Entrenchment index  the sum of six antitakeover provisions tracked by RiskMetrics (staggered boards, 
limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amendments) as in 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
Board size the natural logarithm of the number of directors on the board 
62 
Board ownership  the equity owned by all directors (excluding the CEO) as a proportion of the firm’s 
shares outstanding 
Independent board (0,1) one if at least half of the board’s directors are independent. A director is 
considered independent if s/he is not a current or former employee of the firm 
or a subsidiary, and is not affiliated with the company as defined by 
RiskMetrics. 
Handpicked comp. committee (0,1)  one if at least half of the compensation committee’s directors are appointed after 
the current CEO is in the chief executive position 
Institutional ownership  the equity owned by all institutions as a proportion of the firm’s shares outstanding 
Deal characteristics  
Acquisition premium the offer price divided by the target’s stock price four weeks before the merger 
announcement date, as reported by SDC and limited between 0% and 200% 
Synergy the three day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for a value-weighted portfolio 
of the acquirer and the target around the merger announcement date similar 
to the method of Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988). This CAR is calculated as 
the residual from the market model estimated during the one year window 
ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement. The target’s weight is 
adjusted for the bidder’s toehold. 
Acquirer CAR (-1,+1) the acquirer’s CAR over the window (-1,+1) around the merger announcement 
date, calculated as the residual from the market model estimated during the 
one year window ending four weeks prior to the merger announcement 
Merged firm post-deal op. performance the operating gain to mergers, calculated as the mean industry-adjusted ROA over 
the three-year post-merger period as in Harford, Humphrey-Jenner, and 
Powell (2012) 
Division of merger gains  the target’s gain relative to the acquirer’s gain defined as target $CAR minus 
acquirer $CAR divided by the sum of acquirer and target market values 50 
trading days before the merger announcement as in Ahern (2012). This 
division of merger gains measure represents the relative gain of the target 
versus the acquirer for each dollar of total market value, without the concern 
that total gains may be negative. 
Goodwill impairment (0,1) one if the acquirer reports an impairment of goodwill related to the merger in year 
1 or year 2 after the completion date 
Relative size (Target/Acquirer) the target’s market value of equity divided by the acquirer’s market value of equity 
Private acquirer (0,1) one if the bidder is not publicly traded 
Toehold  the percentage of the target’s shares owned by the bidder 
Cash payment (0,1) one if the deal is paid entirely in cash 
Tender offer (0,1) one if the form of the deal is tender offer 
Hostile deal (0,1) one if the deal is classified hostile by SDC 
Competed deal (0,1) one if the deal has a competed offer identified by SDC 
Target termination fee (0,1) one if the target has a termination fee provision in the merger contract 
Lockup (0,1) one if the deal includes a lockup of target or acquirer shares 
Same industry (0,1) one if both the target and the acquirer belong to the same Fama and French (1997) 
48 industrial classification group 
Merger of equals (0,1) one if the deal is classified by SDC as a merger of equals 
Target initiated deal (0,1) one if the deal is initiated by the target 
Acquirer input / Total target output the industry-level percentage of dollars of acquirer industry input for each target 
industry output dollar as in Ahern (2012) 
Acquirer purchases / Total target sales the percentage of all target industry sales purchased by the acquirer industry as in 
Ahern (2012) 
Target industry M&A liquidity index the liquidity of the market for corporate control for the target firm’s industry. This 
variable is defined as the value of all corporate control transactions for US$1 
million or more reported by SDC for each year and industry divided by the 
total book value of assets of all Compustat firms in the same industry and 
year, as in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002) 
One year macroeconomic change the difference in the industrial production index over one year before the merger 
  
 
 
